

Civil Justice Subcommittee

Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:00 PM 404 HOB

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS

BILL #:

HB 229 **Land Trusts**

SPONSOR(S): Rodríguez

TIED BILLS: None IDEN./SIM. BILLS:

None

REFERENCE	ACTION	ANALYST	STAFF DIRECTOR or BUDGET/POLICY CHIEF
1) Civil Justice Subcommittee		Ward///	Bond N
2) Insurance & Banking Subcommittee			
3) Judiciary Committee			

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

A land trust is a form of ownership of real property in which a trustee holds legal title to the land and a beneficiary retains the power of direction over the trustee and thus retains the power to direct the trustee to sell or mortgage the real property. This bill:

- Better defines the difference between a land trust and a general trust, defining a land trust by the largely ministerial duties of the trustee.
- Codifies in the Florida Land Trust Act a number of land trust practices commonly used in Florida and Illinois and derived from judicial precedents or land trust treatises.
- Includes improvements based on the experience of Florida land trust practitioners that are intended to facilitate and encourage the use of land trusts in Florida real property transactions.

This bill does not appear to have a fiscal impact on state or local governments.

This bill has an effective date of upon becoming law.

This document does not reflect the intent or official position of the bill sponsor or House of Representatives. STORAGE NAME: h0229.CJS.DOCX

FULL ANALYSIS

I. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

A. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

Background

Florida law recognizes a number of types of trusts. In most instances a trustee is obligated to use a high standard of care in investing and handling assets. There is a duty to account to the beneficiary and the assets of a trust might change. In contrast, the trustee of a land trust has legal title to a single asset for purposes of marketability, makes almost no discretionary decisions, and takes direction from the beneficiary regarding that asset. Thus, there is a distinct body of law that applies to land trusts already established, which this bill seeks to codify and standardize in Florida.

Land trusts were developed first in Illinois, which remains the model for the standard arrangement, in order to create a vehicle for simple transfer of title to property owned by a number of people. As opposed to other types of trusts in Florida, the trustee is a place-holder for ease of transfer and marketability of title. The trustee takes direction from the beneficiaries, and therefore has few if any fiduciary duties, nor any duties to account to the beneficiaries beyond sales transactions. This distinction is significant since Florida also has enacted the Florida Trust Code, which imposes significant duties upon other types of trustees which have no real relevance to the duties of the land trust trustee described in the Florida Land Trust Act.

Section 689.071, F.S., was enacted in 1963 as the Florida Land Trust Act, to validate the use of Illinois land trusts in Florida and to confirm the marketability of real property titles derived through a land trustee. Accordingly, this statute has always focused primarily on the authority of the land trustee to convey good title to third parties if the prior deed to the land trustee granted to the trustee certain powers to deal with and dispose of the property, commonly referred to as "deed powers." Acting primarily as a "title estoppel" statute, s. 689.071, F.S., protects third party grantees, mortgagees and lessees who rely on the statutory authority of the trustee based on those recorded deed powers, without requiring them to inquire into the identity of the beneficiaries or the terms of the unrecorded trust agreement.

Although the words "land trust" appear in the section caption, the operation and effect of the deed powers provisions are not expressly limited to trusts based on the Illinois land trust model. Rather, the title provisions of the statute operate with respect to any recorded instrument to a trustee containing deed powers. As a result, it became a common practice in Florida to include s. 689.071, F.S., deed powers in conveyances to all trustees even if the trust was not intended to be a land trust in order to obtain the title estoppel benefits of the statute.

Over the years, s. 689.071, F.S., was amended to include other provisions pertaining to land trusts, such as expanding former s. 737.306, F.S., (limitation on personal liability of trustees) to cover land trustees in response to a case holding that those protections were not available to land trustees. In 2006 and 2007, s. 689.071, F.S., was expanded to add rudimentary governance provisions for land trusts and a procedure for appointing successor land trustees, and the expanded section was renamed the "Florida Land Trust Act." The definition of the term "land trust" by reference to inclusion of deed powers in the conveyance deed to the trustee appeared in the statute for the first time in 2007.

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¹ Chapter 736, F.S.

² Section 689.071, et seq., F.S.

³ See s. 679.071(3), F.S.

⁴ "Title estoppel" is the representation to a bona fide purchaser by a land trustee that he or she is fully able to transfer the legal title to the subject property, that the transferee is protected from title assaults by the beneficiaries of the trust, that the beneficiaries need not be disclosed, that the trust document need not be disclosed, and other assurances that the purchaser and others may safely deal with the trustee.

Effect of the Bill

A. General Overview

This bill clarifies the distinction between a land trust governed by s. 689.071, F.S., and other express trusts governed by the Florida Trust Code,⁵ yet preserve the title estoppel benefits of the existing statute for any conveyance to a trustee containing deed powers. To accomplish this objective, this bill:

- Defines land trusts based on the functional scope of the land trustee's duties, although deed powers would remain an essential element of a Florida land trust; and
- Relocates all the title estoppel provisions of s. 689.071, F.S., to a newly created section⁶ which will remain equally applicable to any conveyance containing deed powers⁷ to a trustee of any trust.

A transitional provision makes the new functional land trust definition apply only to trusts created on or after the effective date of the bill, and a trust existing before the effective date is classified as a land trust based on the intentions of the parties as expressed in or discerned from the existing trust agreement.

The relocated title estoppel provisions in the new section apply to any real property conveyed to a trustee at any time by an instrument containing deed powers, regardless of whether the trust is a land trust or not. By separating the title estoppel statute from the land trust statute in this way, this bill does not change the results intended by the parties to any trust agreement existing on the date that the bill becomes effective.

In addition to transferring the title estoppel provisions to a new section,⁸ the bill also codifies in amended s. 689.071, F.S., a number of land trust practices and principles commonly used in Florida and Illinois and derived from judicial precedents or land trust treatises.

B. Point by Point Analysis

1. Title Estoppel Provisions - Creation of s. 689.073, F.S.

The marketability of title, and sometimes anonymity of the beneficial owner, is primary reasons for a land trust. Anyone who deals with the trustee must be assured that the trustee has legal ownership and full authority to deal with the property, and must also be assured that any claims between the land trustee and the beneficiaries will not affect the transaction or the grantee.

Currently these assurance provisions, called "title estoppel" provisions are set out in ss. 689.071(3), (4), and (5), F.S. The bill relocates the title estoppel provisions to a new section entitled, "Powers conferred on trustee in recorded instrument." and creates a new subsection, s. 689.073. F.S.

In moving the provisions to the new statute, ¹⁰ changes were made to:

• Remove language regarding the vesting of both "legal and equitable title" in the trustee;

¹⁰ As revised, s. 689.071(3), F.S., becomes s. 689.073(1), F.S.

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⁵ Chapter 736, F.S.

⁶ Section 689.073, F.S. is created.

⁷ "Deed powers," as used in this analysis refer to the language of s. 689.071(3), F.S, which is, "to protect, to conserve, to sell, to lease, to encumber, or otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property described in the recorded instrument."

⁸ Section 689.073, F.S.

⁹ Section 1 of the bill relocates and slightly revises ss. 689.071(3), (4) and (5), F.S., moving them to a new s. 689.073, F.S.. Subsections (4) and (5) are simply relocated as-is and renumbered s. 689.073(2) and (3), F.S.

- Remove the reference to real property "in this state:"11
- Relocate to s. 689.073(5), F.S., certain existing criteria for applicability; and
- Simplify the remaining language.

The bill continues to vest in a trustee full power and authority to deal with the property as provided in the deed powers granted in the deed. The exclusion for instruments governed by s. 689.07, F.S. [existing s. 689.071(12), F.S.] is relocated to s. 689.073(4), F.S., changing only the words "this act" to "this section."

Currently, the title estoppel provisions are operative whether or not the conveyance deed refers to the beneficiaries or any unrecorded trust agreement. 12 The bill creates s. 689.073(5), F.S., which:

- Carries forward the provision that conveyance by the trustee is free of claims of beneficiaries;
- Expressly provides that the title estoppel provisions work regardless of the provisions of any unrecorded trust agreement and regardless of whether the trust is a land trust or an express trust: and
- Clarifies that the title estoppel section applies both to deeds recorded after the effective date of the proposed amendments and to deeds recorded under the present statute. 13

This provision confirms that the relocation of the title estoppel section is not intended to change the legal effect of any previous conveyances under the present statute, and for good measure all such previous conveyances are validated as vesting the trustee with the requisite deed powers.

2. Definition of "Land Trust" - Revisions to s. 689.071(2), F.S.

The bill revises the remaining provisions of s. 689.071, F.S., which were not moved to the new section. 14 The revised definition of "land trust" 15 still requires a conveyance to a trustee by a recorded instrument containing deed powers, but beginning with the effective date of the bill this definition focuses on the key functional distinction between a land trust and other express trusts: that a land trustee functions almost entirely as the agent of the beneficiaries or the person holding the power of direction under the trust agreement, whereas a trustee who is subject to the Florida Trust Code in ch. 736. F.S., has more extensive fiduciary duties and responsibilities to the trust beneficiaries, along with more extensive potential liability if the trustee fails to perform the trustee's discretionary duties prudently.

A land trustee has a fiduciary relationship to the land trust beneficiaries and the persons holding the "power of direction" over the actions of the land trustee, just as any agent is bound as a fiduciary to the principal for whom the agent acts. 16 However, in practice, land trustees are rarely delegated discretionary duties under a land trust agreement, beyond ministerial and administrative matters. 17 This lack of duties is a logical parallel to the exemption that land trustees enjoy from ch. 736, F.S., responsibilities and liabilities. The bill makes clear this practical distinction in the revised definition of a land trust¹⁸ by stating that the trustee has limited duties as set out in the statute.

For trusts created on or after the effective date of the bill, the revised definition will limit the duties of a trustee of a "land trust" to the following:

This provision confirms that out-of-state lands may be held in Florida land trust regimes.

¹² Section 689.071(3), F.S.

¹³ Section 689.071(3), F.S.

¹⁴ Section 689.073, F.S.

Section 689.071(2)(c), F.S.,
 Raborn v. Menotte, 974 So.2d 328 (Fla. 2008).

¹⁷ "The trustee is a mere vessel of title." *Brigham v. Brigham*, 11 So.3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

¹⁸ Section 689.071(2)(c), F.S.

- The duty to exercise the trustee's deed powers as directed by the beneficiary or by the holder of the power of direction (i.e., this is the agent's fiduciary duty to follow the principal's directions);
- The duty to dispose of the trust property at the termination of the trust (i.e., the classic "active" duty that historically saved Illinois land trusts from the statute of uses);
- The duty to perform ministerial and administrative functions delegated to the trustee; and
- The duties required of certain timeshare trustees by ch. 721, F.S.¹⁹

If the trustee's duties exceed the foregoing limited duties and the trust is created after the effective date of the proposed amendment, then the trust will not be treated as a land trust and will not be excluded from the operation of ch. 736, F.S.²⁰

Because the title estoppel provisions of the statute operate on any conveyance containing deed powers, the classification of the trust as a "land trust" will have no effect on the title to any real property held by the trustee.

3. Other Definitions - Revisions to s. 689.071(2), F.S.

Besides revising the definition of "land trust," section 2 of the bill adds and clarifies some other definitions of lesser significance in s. 689.071(2), F.S:

- The definition for "holder of the power of direction" was revised and shortened to "power of direction" because "holder of" was not used consistently in the statute;
- The phrase "person or entity" was shortened to "person" in numerous places (beginning with the definition of "beneficiary") because the statutory definition of "person" includes entities;
- New definitions were created for some basic trust concepts, such as "trust agreement," "trust property" and "recorded instrument" (the latter being a cross-reference to the relocated deed powers provision now found in s. 689.073(1), F.S.);
- "Trustee" is redefined so that the term will work in the "switchbox" provision to mean the trustee
 of a land trust or the trustee of another trust. For this reason, numerous references to "trustee"
 in revised s. 689.071, F.S., will be changed to "trustee of a land trust" where that meaning is
 intended:
- 4. Vesting of "Legal and Equitable Title" Revisions to s. 689.071(3), F.S.

The bill continues the existing statutory statement that a land trustee is vested with both legal and equitable title to the trust property. This vesting of "legal and equitable title" provision is a land trust characteristic imported from Illinois, and therefore it does not appear in the relocated title estoppel provisions in s. 689.073, F.S., that universally apply to any type of trust with deed powers. Although the "legal and equitable" language has been excised from a number of other subsections of s. 689.071, F.S., to avoid potential circularity, s. 689.071(3), F.S., will continue to contain the operative language regarding vesting of legal and equitable title in the land trustee.

The bill makes technical revisions to s. 689.071(3), F.S:

- Because new s. 689.073, F.S., now defines the requirements for a "recorded instrument" containing deed powers, the bill does not repeat this in the new s. 689.071(3), F.S;
- The statement that the recorded instrument does not by itself create an entity has been relocated to the end of s. 689.071(3), F.S., instead of appearing in the definition of "land trust."

²⁰ Chapter 736 is the Florida Trust Code and applies to express trusts.

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¹⁹ Section 721.08, F.S. provides that time share accommodations may be placed into a trust. This will be addressed in detail below, in regard to the effect of this statute.

- Other housekeeping edits to s. 689.071(3), F.S., concern the consistent use of defined terms such as "land trust," "trust agreement" and "trust property."
- 5. Statute of Uses and Doctrine of Merger Revisions to ss. 689.071(4) and (5), F.S.

When s. 689.071, F.S., was first enacted for the purpose of validating the use of Illinois land trusts in Florida, one commonly assumed result was that land trusts would not be executed as "passive trusts" or "dry trusts" by the statute of uses, which is codified in Florida in s. 689.09, F.S. The bill makes that result explicit with respect to a land trust, overriding not only s. 689.09, F.S., but also the common-law statute of uses.

New subsection 689.071(5), F.S., overrides the doctrine of merger with respect to a land trust, so that a land trust will not be extinguished if the trustee is the sole beneficiary. Former s. 689.071(5), F.S., is one of the title estoppel provisions relocated verbatim to s. 689.073, F.S.

6. Personal Property Option-- Revisions to s. 689.071(6), F.S.

Currently section 689.071, F.S., provides that the recorded instrument may define and declare the interests of land trust beneficiaries as personal property under Florida law.²¹ The bill clarifies that this designation of personal property must be made in the recorded instrument or the trust agreement, or it will be considered real property.

Subsection 689.071(6), F.S., is changed in one regard: the optional personal property declaration can be made in the recorded instrument or in the trust agreement. This change is consistent with the relocation of the title estoppel provisions to new s. 689.073, F.S., which governs title matters that depend on the contents of the recorded instrument. Whether the beneficial interests are real property or personal property does not affect the nature of the title vested in the trustee or the ability of third parties to acquire good title to the trust property from the trustee in accordance with the powers contained in the recorded instrument.

As noted above, revised s. 689.071(6), F.S., contains edits for the consistent usage of defined terms such as "land trust" and "trust agreement."

7. Beneficiary Provisions-- Revisions to s. 689.071(8), F.S.

Currently, customary provisions in land trusts are based upon treatises by Illinois land trust authorities, particularly Kenoe on Land Trusts.²² The bill revises 689.071(8), F.S., in a number of respects to codify these land trust practices.

Revised s. 689.071(8)(a), F.S., is a non-substantive combination of former paragraphs (a), (b) and (d), intended to consolidate similar provisions and make paragraph numbers (b) and (d) available for other new provisions. The bill adds s. 689.071(8)(b), F.S., as a statutory endorsement of flexible beneficial ownership techniques described in the Kenoe treatise. The purpose of including these provisions directly in the Land Trust Act is to increase public awareness that such techniques are available without making reference to the treatise, thereby promoting the usage of land trusts in Florida generally.

The bill revises s. 689.071(8)(c), F.S., to reconcile the Land Trust Act with the U.C.C. Article 9 exclusion of interests in real property.²³ Caselaw²⁴ holds that a beneficial interest in a land trust is a general intangible within the scope of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, and this result is codified in the present version of s. 689.071(8)(c), F.S., which provides that U.C.C. Article 9 governs the

²¹ Except of course for the stamp tax provision in s. 201.02(4), F.S.

²² Henry W. Kenoe wrote a number of treatises on land trusts which are now out of print.

These provisions are found in s. 679.1091(4)(k), F.S.

²⁴ In re Cowsert, 14 B.R. 335 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1981).

perfection of a security interest in a beneficial interest in a land trust. However, if the beneficial interest is defined as real property under s. 689.071(6), F.S., then there is a possible contradiction between the Land Trust Act (which says Article 9 applies to beneficial interests) and the U.C.C. (which says Article 9 excludes real property interests).

Currently ch. 721, F.S. (the Florida Vacation Plan and Timeshare Act) authorizes the creation and marketing of timeshare estates through trusts.²⁵ Because timeshare estates are defined as real property²⁶ the purchasers of Florida timeshare estates typically finance their purchase with a mortgage recorded against the timeshare estate. However, if the timeshare estate is created as a beneficial interest in a timeshare trust a land trust is created. As a result, two different statutes prescribe two different methods of perfection, causing possible confusion in the mechanics of perfecting the lien.²⁷

The bill revises s. 689.071(8)(c), F.S., to resolve this apparent contradiction by clarifying that the U.C.C. governs perfection if the beneficial interest in a land trust is declared to be personal property (as was the case in *Cowsert*), but that a mortgage instrument recorded in the real estate records is the proper method of perfection if the beneficial interest in a land trust is declared to be real property. In the latter case, the proper county for recording the mortgage may be specified in the recorded instrument or in a declaration of trust or memorandum that is recorded in the same county as the recorded instrument; otherwise the location of the trust property determines the proper county for recording the mortgage. The bill provides a transition rule²⁸ to provide for the continuation of perfection for any U.C.C. financing statement that may have been filed before the effective date of this clarification. It is an abbreviated version of the transition rules that were included in Revised U.C.C. Article 9 in 2001.

The bill revises the existing last sentence of s. 689.071(8)(c), F.S., to state more clearly that a lien or security interest perfected against a beneficial interest in a land trust does not affect in any way the legal or equitable title of the land trustee to the trust property. New s. 689.071(8)(d), F.S., makes explicit a concept that is inherent in a beneficiary's ability to encumber a beneficial interest as described in existing s. 689.071(8)(c), F.S: the trustee's legal and equitable title to the trust property is separate and distinct from the beneficiary's beneficial interest in the land trust and the trust property. A lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest or other encumbrance against one interest does not automatically attach to the other interest. Section 689.071(8)(e), F.S., is also revised to clarify this same point: documents recorded by a beneficiary to transfer or encumber a beneficial interest do not affect the legal and equitable title of the trustee or the deed powers granted to the trustee in the recorded instrument.

Sections 689.071(8)(f) and (g), F.S., as well as other parts of s. 689.071(8), F.S., have been edited for consistent usage of the defined terms "land trust," "recorded instrument," "trust agreement," and "trust property."

The bill adds s. 689.071(8)(i), F.S., which is intended to end the reported occasional practice by some judges of appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of land trust beneficiaries in a foreclosure or other litigation affecting title to the trust property. Because a land trustee is vested with both legal and equitable title to the trust property, joinder of the land trustee in the action is sufficient without incurring the additional expense of a guardian ad litem.

8. Successor Trustee Provisions-- Revisions to s. 689.071(9), F.S.

Most of the revisions to s. 689.071(9), F.S., are non-substantive edits for consistent usage of defined terms and modernization of language (e.g., replacing "office of the recorder of deeds" with "public

²⁸ See the newly created s. 689.071(15), F.S.

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²⁵ See s. 721.08(2)(c)4, F.S.

²⁶ See s. 721.05(34), F.S.,

²⁷ The conflict exists between UCC Article 9 and the Land Trust Act.

records"). The bill deletes s. 689.071(9)(a), F.S., because the "switchbox" provision in subsection 689.071(12) globally addresses the inapplicability of chapter 736 to land trusts.

The existing text of s. 689.071(9), F.S., uses the expression "each successor trustee" to avoid the longer phrase "the successor trustee or trustees." Unfortunately, it is possible to misread the shorter phrase to mean "each and every successor trustee" in a series of successors.²⁹ The longer expression is clearer and replaces the shorter one.

Existing s. 689.071(9)(f), F.S., provides that the beneficiaries may direct the land trustee to convey the trust property to another trustee. The bill changes this paragraph to provide that this direction to convey could also come from the person holding the power of direction.

9. Trustee as Creditor-- Revisions to s. 689.071(10), F.S.

The bill revises s. 689.071(10)(a), F.S., to include a conforming reference to a mortgage (as well as a security interest) against a beneficial interest in a land trust. Other non-substantive edits include consistent usage of defined terms and the deletion of "or entity" after "person."

10. Notices to Trustee Provisions-- Revisions to s. 689.071(11), F.S.

The bill adds a new subsection to assure that the right parties receive any third-party notices concerning property held in a land trust by requiring that notice to a land trustee include certain identifying information if it appears in the recorded instrument.

11. "Switchbox" Provision; Timeshare Trusts-- Revisions to s. 689.071(12), F.S.

The revised "land trust" definition discussed above contains a cross-reference to a transition rule that appears in s. 689.071(12), F.S., sometimes referred to below as the "switchbox" provision. This transition rule exempts existing land trusts from the new duties-based test in s. 689.071(2)(c), F.S; rather, an existing trust is a land trust (or not) based on the intentions expressed in (or discernible from) the existing trust agreement. As a practical matter, the overwhelming majority of existing land trusts sharply curtail the discretionary duties of the land trustee, such that those existing trusts would meet the new duties-based "land trust" definition even if it were applied to them retroactively. But because there are some land trust agreements that vest the land trustee with greater discretion, the switchbox provision does not apply the duties-based test to any existing land trust agreement that says the trust is a "land trust" or clearly was intended to be a land trust. In this way, existing obvious land trusts are "grandfathered" into the land trust statute.

There are two necessary exceptions to the switchbox provision: (1) if it is not obvious from reading the existing trust agreement that the parties intended to create a land trust, then the duties-based test applies; and (2) if an existing land trust agreement is amended to add or expand duties of the trustee, then the duties-based test is applied only to the added or expanded duties that were not found in the trust agreement before the effective date of the amended act. In either case, if the trustee has or adds too many duties beyond those in the land trust definition, the result is that the trustee becomes subject to the tougher trustee standards of ch. 736, F.S., but there is no effect on the title to the trust property.

As noted above in the discussion of timeshare interests, current statutes³⁰ authorize the use of trusts for the creation and marketing of timeshare estates; and specify similar requirements for using trusts for multi-site vacation clubs.³¹ These statutes specify that certain provisions of the Florida Trust Code

²⁹ E.g., existing paragraph s. 689.071(9)(c), F.S., requires that "each successor trustee shall file a declaration of appointment."

³⁰ Chapter 721, F.S.

³¹ Section 721.53(1)(e), F.S. **STORAGE NAME**: h0229.CJS.DOCX **DATE**: 2/10/2013

govern the liability of the trustees of such qualifying trusts,³² and these provisions are usually recited in the Chapter 721 trust agreements. If such an existing timeshare trust were created as a land trust, however, then the trust agreement would contain provisions stating that the trust is a land trust (making it a land trust³³ but would also refer to governance by these specific provisions of Chapter 736.

Accordingly, the "switchbox" provision³⁴ expressly ignores these references to Chapter 736 in the trust agreement of a trust qualifying as a timeshare estate trust³⁵or a vacation club trust.³⁶

Similar considerations under ch. 721, F.S., led to the inclusion in the revised s. 689.071(2)(c), F.S., a list of limited duties for land trustees. Most of the recited ch. 736, F.S., provisions that apply to timeshare trusts³⁷pertain to limitations on the liability of the trustee, but one of them³⁸ also imposes duties on a trustee. In addition, ch. 721, F.S., also directly imposes certain duties on the trustee of a timeshare estate trust or a vacation club trust, although arguably those duties fall into the ministerial and administrative category. Further, it is conceivable that ch. 721, F.S., might be amended in the future to impose other duties on timeshare trustees. To preserve the utility of land trusts as a structure for organizing timeshare estate trusts and vacation club trusts qualifying under ch. 721, F.S., revised s. 689.071(2)(c), F.S., simply includes in the list of limited land trustee duties any duties that are imposed on the trustee under ch. 721, F.S.

12. Florida Trust Code - Scope Provision-- Revisions to s. 736.0102, F.S.

The bill includes a conforming amendment to s. 736.0102, F.S., of the Florida Trust Code. The bill divides this section into two logical subsections, and a third subsection is added to address the exclusion of land trusts from the Florida Trust Code. New s. 736.0102(3), F.S., provides that the Trust Code does not apply to land trusts under s. 689.071, F.S., except to the extent provided in subsection 689.071(7), F.S., of the Land Trust Act and in the two provisions of ch. 721, F.S., that apply parts of ch. 736, F.S., to timeshare trusts.

The bill adds s. 736.0102(3), F.S., to provide that a Trust Code trust remains a Trust Code trust (and does not become a land trust) regardless of any amendment or change in asset composition or utilization of a sub trust.

B. SECTION DIRECTORY:

Section 1 creates s. 689.073, F.S., from portions of s. 689.071, F.S., regarding powers conferred on the trustee of a land trust.

Section 2 amends s. 689.071, F.S., regarding land trusts, definitions and law.

Section 3 amends s. 736.0102, F.S., a portion of the trust code, to exclude land trusts.

Section 4 is a direction regarding the effective date.

Section 5 provides that this bill is effective upon becoming law.

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 $^{^{\}rm 32}$ See specifically, ss. 736.08125, 736.08163, 736.1013 and 736.1015, F.S.

³³ See s. 689.071(14)(b)1, F.S.

³⁴ See s. 689.071(12)(b), F.S. ³⁵ See s. 721.08(2)(c)4, F.S.

³⁶ See s. 721.53(1)(e), F.S.

³⁷ See ch. 721, F.S.,

³⁸ See s. 736.08163, F.S., concerning environmental matters.

II. FISCAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT

A. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENT:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state expenditures.

B. FISCAL IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government expenditures.

C. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR:

The bill does not appear to have any direct economic impact on the private sector.

D. FISCAL COMMENTS:

None.

III. COMMENTS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

1. Applicability of Municipality/County Mandates Provision:

The bill does not appear to require counties or municipalities to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds, reduce the authority that counties or municipalities have to raise revenue in the aggregate, nor reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties or municipalities.

2. Other:

None.

B. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY:

The bill does not appear to create a need for rulemaking or rulemaking authority.

C. DRAFTING ISSUES OR OTHER COMMENTS:

Lines 4 and 5 of the title may not be sufficiently tied to the substance of the bill. Lines 24 through 26 appear to be an inaccurate description of the section described, which, according to the sequence of the title, would be lines 301 through 344.

IV. AMENDMENTS/ COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE CHANGES

n/a

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A bill to be entitled An act relating to land trusts; creating s. 689.073, F.S.; revising provisions relating to vesting of ownership in a trustee; revising rights, liabilities, and duties of land trust beneficiaries; providing exclusion and applicability; amending s. 689.071, F.S.; revising and providing definitions; revising provisions relating to land trust transfers of real property and vesting of ownership in a trustee; prohibiting the operation of the statute of uses to execute a land trust or to vest the trust property under certain conditions; prohibiting the operation of the doctrine of merger to execute a land trust or to vest the trust property under certain conditions; providing conditions under which a beneficial interest is deemed real property; revising and providing rights, liabilities, and duties of land trust beneficiaries; authorizing certain beneficial ownership methods; providing for the perfection of security documents; providing that a trustee's legal and equitable title to the trust property is separate and distinct from the beneficiary's beneficial interest in the land trust and the trust property; prohibiting a lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance against one interest from automatically attaching to another interest; providing that the appointment of a guardian ad litem is not necessary in certain foreclosure litigation

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affecting the title to trust property of a land trust; conforming provisions to changes made by the act; deleting provisions relating to the applicability of certain successor trustee provisions; providing notice requirements; providing for the determination of applicable law for certain trusts; providing for applicability relating to Uniform Commercial Code financing statements; providing requirements for recording effectiveness; amending s. 736.0102, F.S.; revising and providing scope of the Florida Trust Code; providing a directive to the Division of Law Revision and Information; providing an effective date.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. Section 689.073, Florida Statutes, is created, and present subsections (4) and (5) of section 689.071, Florida Statutes, are transferred and renumbered as subsections (2) and (3), respectively, of section 689.073, Florida Statutes, and amended, to read:

689.073 Powers conferred on trustee in recorded instrument.—

(1) OWNERSHIP VESTS IN TRUSTEE.—Every conveyance, deed, mortgage, lease assignment, or other instrument heretofore or hereafter made, hereinafter referred to as the "recorded instrument," transferring any interest in real property, including, but not limited to, a leasehold or mortgagee interest, to any person or any corporation, bank, trust company,

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83 84 or other entity duly formed under the laws of its state of qualification, which recorded instrument designates the person, corporation, bank, trust company, or other entity "trustee" or "as trustee" and confers on the trustee the power and authority to protect, to conserve, to sell, to lease, to encumber, or otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property described in the recorded instrument, is effective to vest, and is declared to have vested, in such trustee full power and authority as granted and provided in the recorded instrument to deal in and with such property, or interest therein or any part thereof, held in trust under the recorded instrument.

NO DUTY TO INQUIRE. - Any grantee, mortgagee, lessee, transferee, assignee, or person obtaining satisfactions or releases or otherwise in any way dealing with the trustee with respect to the real property or any interest in such property held in trust under the recorded instrument, as hereinabove provided for, is not obligated to inquire into the identification or status of any named or unnamed beneficiaries, or their heirs or assigns to whom a trustee may be accountable under the terms of the recorded instrument, or under any unrecorded separate declarations or agreements collateral to the recorded instrument, whether or not such declarations or agreements are referred to therein; or to inquire into or ascertain the authority of such trustee to act within and exercise the powers granted under the recorded instrument; or to inquire into the adequacy or disposition of any consideration, if any is paid or delivered to such trustee in connection with any interest so acquired from such trustee; or to inquire into

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any of the provisions of any such unrecorded declarations or agreements.

- (3)(5) BENEFICIARY CLAIMS.—All persons dealing with the trustee under the recorded instrument as hereinabove provided take any interest transferred by the trustee thereunder, within the power and authority as granted and provided therein, free and clear of the claims of all the named or unnamed beneficiaries of such trust, and of any unrecorded declarations or agreements collateral thereto whether referred to in the recorded instrument or not, and of anyone claiming by, through, or under such beneficiaries. However, this section does not prevent a beneficiary of any such unrecorded collateral declarations or agreements from enforcing the terms thereof against the trustee.
- (4) EXCLUSION.—This section does not apply to any deed, mortgage, or other instrument to which s. 689.07 applies.
- whether any reference is made in the recorded instrument to the beneficiaries of such trust or to any separate collateral unrecorded declarations or agreements, without regard to the provisions of any unrecorded trust agreement or declaration of trust, and without regard to whether the trust is governed by s. 689.071 or chapter 736. This section applies both to recorded instruments that are recorded after the effective date of this act and to recorded instruments that were previously recorded and governed by similar provisions formerly contained in s. 689.071(3), and any such recorded instrument purporting to confer power and authority on a trustee under such formerly

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effective provisions of 689.071(3) is valid and has the effect of vesting full power and authority in such trustee as provided in this section.

Section 2. Section 689.071, Florida Statutes, as amended by this act, is amended to read:

689.071 Florida Land Trust Act.-

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- (1) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the "Florida Land Trust Act."
 - (2) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section, the term:
- (a) "Beneficial interest" means any interest, vested or contingent and regardless of how small or minimal such interest may be, in a land trust which is held by a beneficiary.
- (b) "Beneficiary" means any person or entity having a beneficial interest in a land trust. A trustee may be a beneficiary of the land trust for which such trustee serves as trustee.
- (c) "Holder of the power of direction" means any person or entity having the authority to direct the trustee to convey property or interests, execute a mortgage, distribute proceeds of a sale or financing, and execute documents incidental to the administration of a land trust.
- (c) (d) "Land trust" means any express written agreement or arrangement by which a use, confidence, or trust is declared of any land, or of any charge upon land, under which the title to real property, including, but not limited to, a leasehold or mortgagee interest, both legal and equitable, is vested in a trustee by a recorded instrument that confers on the trustee the power and authority prescribed in s. 689.073(1) and under which

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141 the trustee has no duties other than the following:

- 1. The duty to convey, sell, lease, mortgage, or deal with the trust property, or to exercise such other powers concerning the trust property as may be provided in the recorded instrument, in each case as directed by the beneficiaries or by the holder of the power of direction;
- 2. The duty to sell or dispose of the trust property at the termination of the trust;
- 3. The duty to perform ministerial and administrative functions delegated to the trustee in the trust agreement or by the beneficiaries or the holder of the power of direction; or
- 4. The duties required of a trustee under chapter 721, if the trust is a timeshare estate trust complying with s. 721.08(2)(c)4. or a vacation club trust complying with s. 721.53(1)(e);

However, the duties of the trustee of a land trust created before the effective date of this act may exceed the limited duties listed in this paragraph to the extent authorized in subsection (12) subsection (3). The recorded instrument does not itself create an entity, regardless of whether the relationship among the beneficiaries and the trustee is deemed to be an entity under other applicable law.

(d) "Power of direction" means the authority of a person, as provided in the trust agreement, to direct the trustee of a land trust to convey property or interests, execute a lease or mortgage, distribute proceeds of a sale or financing, and execute documents incidental to the administration of a land

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169 <u>trust.</u>

- (e) "Recorded instrument" has the same meaning as provided in s. 689.073(1).
- (f) "Trust agreement" means the written agreement
 governing a land trust or other trust, including any amendments.
- (g) "Trust property" means any interest in real property, including, but not limited to, a leasehold or mortgagee interest, conveyed by a recorded instrument to a trustee of a land trust or other trust.
- (h) (e) "Trustee" means the person or entity designated in a recorded instrument or trust agreement trust instrument to hold legal and equitable title to the trust property of a land trust or other trust.
- conveyance, deed, mortgage, lease assignment, or other instrument heretofore or hereafter made, hereinafter referred to as the "recorded instrument," transferring any interest in real property trustee of a land trust and conferring upon the trustee the power and authority prescribed in s. 689.073(1), in this state, including, but not limited to, a leasehold or mortgagee interest, to any person or any corporation, bank, trust company, or other entity duly formed under the laws of its state of qualification, in which recorded instrument the person, corporation, bank, trust company, or other entity is designated "trustee" or "as trustee," whether or not reference is made in the recorded instrument to the beneficiaries of such land trust or to the trust agreement or any separate collateral unrecorded declarations or agreements, is effective to vest, and is hereby

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declared to have vested, in such trustee both legal and equitable title, and full rights of ownership, over the trust
real property or interest therein, with full power and authority as granted and provided in the recorded instrument to deal in and with the trust property or interest therein or any part thereof. The recorded instrument does not itself create an entity, regardless of whether the relationship among the beneficiaries and the trustee is deemed to be an entity under other applicable law; provided, the recorded instrument confers on the trustee the power and authority to protect, to conserve, to sell, to lease, to encumber, or otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property described in the recorded instrument.

- (4) STATUTE OF USES INAPPLICABLE.—Section 689.09 and the statute of uses do not execute a land trust or vest the trust property in the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the land trust, notwithstanding any lack of duties on the part of the trustee or the otherwise passive nature of the land trust.
- (5) DOCTRINE OF MERGER INAPPLICABLE.—The doctrine of merger does not extinguish a land trust or vest the trust property in the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the land trust, regardless of whether the trustee is the sole beneficiary of the land trust.
- (6) PERSONAL PROPERTY.—In all cases in which the recorded instrument or the trust agreement, as hereinabove provided, contains a provision defining and declaring the interests of beneficiaries of a land trust thereunder to be personal property only, such provision is shall be controlling for all purposes

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when such determination becomes an issue under the laws or in the courts of this state. If no such personal property designation appears in the recorded instrument or in the trust agreement, the interests of the land trust beneficiaries are real property.

- (7) TRUSTEE LIABILITY.—In addition to any other limitation on personal liability existing pursuant to statute or otherwise, the provisions of ss. 736.08125 and 736.1013 apply to the trustee of a land trust created pursuant to this section.
 - (8) LAND TRUST BENEFICIARIES.-

- (a) Except as provided in this section, the beneficiaries of a land trust are not liable, solely by being beneficiaries, under a judgment, decree, or order of court or in any other manner for a debt, obligation, or liability of the land trust.
- (b) Any beneficiary acting under the trust agreement of a land trust is not liable to the land trust's trustee or to any other beneficiary for the beneficiary's good faith reliance on the provisions of the trust agreement. A beneficiary's duties and liabilities under a land trust may be expanded or restricted in a trust agreement or beneficiary agreement.
- (b)1. If provided in the recorded instrument, in the trust agreement, or in a beneficiary agreement:
- a. A particular beneficiary may own the beneficial interest in a particular portion or parcel of the trust property of a land trust;
- b. A particular person may be the holder of the power of direction with respect to the trustee's actions concerning a particular portion or parcel of the trust property of a land

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- c. The beneficiaries may own specified proportions or percentages of the beneficial interest in the trust property or in particular portions or parcels of the trust property of a land trust.
- 2. Multiple beneficiaries may own a beneficial interest in a land trust as tenants in common, joint tenants with right of survivorship, or tenants by the entireties.
- (c) If a beneficial interest in a land trust is determined to be personal property as provided in subsection (6), chapter 679 applies to the perfection of any security interest in that abeneficial interest in a land trust. If a beneficial interest in a land trust is determined to be real property as provided in subsection (6), to perfect a lien or security interest against that beneficial interest, the mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement, or other similar security document must be recorded in the public records of the county that is specified for such security documents in the recorded instrument or in a declaration of trust or memorandum for such security document recorded in the public records of the same county as the recorded instrument. If no county is specified for recording such security documents, the proper county for recording such a security document against a beneficiary's interest in any trust property is the county where the trust property is located. The perfection of a lien or security interest in a beneficial interest in a land trust does not affect, attach to, or encumber the legal or equitable title of the trustee in the trust property and does not impair or diminish the authority of the

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trustee under the recorded instrument, and parties dealing with the trustee are not required to inquire into the terms of the unrecorded trust agreement or any lien or security interest against a beneficial interest in the land trust.

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- The trustee's legal and equitable title to the trust (d) property of a land trust is separate and distinct from the beneficial interest of a beneficiary in the land trust and in the trust property. A lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance attaching to the trustee's legal and equitable title to the trust property of a land trust does not attach to the beneficial interest of any beneficiary; and any lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance against a beneficiary or beneficial interest does not attach to the legal or equitable title of the trustee to the trust property held under a land trust, unless the lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance by its terms or by operation of other law attaches to both the interest of the trustee and the interest of such beneficiary. A beneficiary's duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted in a trust agreement or beneficiary agreement.
- (e) Any subsequent document appearing of record in which a beneficiary of a <u>land</u> trust transfers or encumbers <u>any the</u> beneficial interest in the <u>land</u> trust <u>does not transfer or encumber the legal or equitable title of the trustee to the trust property and does not diminish or impair the authority of the trustee under the terms of the recorded instrument. Parties dealing with the trustee <u>of a land trust</u> are not required to inquire into the terms of the unrecorded trust agreement.</u>

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309 The An unrecorded trust agreement giving rise to a 310 recorded instrument for a land trust may provide that one or 311 more persons or entities have the power to direct the trustee to 312 convey property or interests, execute a mortgage, distribute 313 proceeds of a sale or financing, and execute documents 314 incidental to administration of the land trust. The power of 315 direction, unless provided otherwise in the land trust agreement 316 of the land trust, is conferred upon the holders of the power for the use and benefit of all holders of any beneficial 317 318 interest in the land trust. In the absence of a provision in the 319 land trust agreement of a land trust to the contrary, the power 320 of direction shall be in accordance with the percentage of 321 individual ownership. In exercising the power of direction, the 322 holders of the power of direction are presumed to act in a 323 fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all holders of any 324 beneficial interest in the land trust, unless otherwise provided 325 in the land trust agreement. A beneficial interest in a land 326 trust is indefeasible, and the power of direction may not be 327 exercised so as to alter, amend, revoke, terminate, defeat, or 328 otherwise affect or change the enjoyment of any beneficial 329 interest in a land trust. 330

(g) A <u>land</u> trust relating to real estate does not fail, and any use relating to the trust property real estate may not be defeated, because beneficiaries are not specified by name in the recorded <u>instrument</u> deed of conveyance to the trustee or because duties are not imposed upon the trustee. The power conferred by any recorded <u>instrument</u> deed of conveyance on a trustee of a land trust to sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise

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dispose of property described in the <u>recorded instrument</u> deed is effective, and a person dealing with the trustee <u>of a land trust</u> is not required to inquire any further into the right of the trustee to act or the disposition of any proceeds.

- (h) The principal residence of a beneficiary shall be entitled to the homestead tax exemption even if the homestead is held by a trustee in a land trust, provided the beneficiary qualifies for the homestead exemption under chapter 196.
- (i) In a foreclosure against trust property or other litigation affecting the title to trust property of a land trust, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is not necessary to represent the interest of any beneficiary.
 - (9) SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE.-

(a) The provisions of s. 736.0705 relating to the resignation of a trustee do not apply to the appointment of a successor trustee under this section.

(a) (b) If the recorded instrument and the unrecorded land trust agreement are silent as to the appointment of a successor trustee of a land trust in the event of the death, incapacity, resignation, or termination due to dissolution of a land trustee or if a land trustee is unable to serve as trustee of a land trust, one or more persons or entities having the power of direction of the land trust agreement may appoint a successor trustee or trustees of the land trust by filing a declaration of appointment of a successor trustee or trustees in the public records of office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which the trust property is located. The declaration must be signed by a beneficiary or beneficiaries of the land trust and

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by the each successor trustee or trustees, must be acknowledged in the manner provided for acknowledgment of deeds, and must contain:

1. The legal description of the trust property.

- 2. The name and address of the former trustee.
- 3. The name and address of the each successor trustee or trustees.
- 4. A statement that each successor trustee has been appointed by one or more persons or entities having the power of direction of the land trust appointed the successor trustee or trustees, together with an acceptance of appointment by the each successor trustee or trustees.

(b)(c) If the recorded instrument is silent as to the appointment of a successor trustee or trustees of a land trust but an unrecorded land trust agreement provides for the appointment of a successor trustee or trustees in the event of the death, incapacity, resignation, or termination due to dissolution of the land trustee, of a land trust, upon the appointment of any successor trustee pursuant to the terms of the unrecorded land trust agreement, the each successor trustee or trustees shall file a declaration of appointment of a successor trustee in the public records of office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which the trust property is located. The declaration must be signed by both the former trustee and the each successor trustee or trustees, must be acknowledged in the manner provided for acknowledgment of deeds, and must contain:

1. The legal description of the trust property.

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2. The name and address of the former trustee.

- 3. The name and address of the successor trustee $\underline{\text{or}}$ trustees.
- 4. A statement of resignation by the former trustee and a statement of acceptance of appointment by $\underline{\text{the}}$ each successor trustee or trustees.
- 5. A statement that the each successor trustee or trustees were was duly appointed under the terms of the unrecorded $\frac{1}{2}$ trust agreement.

If the appointment of any successor trustee of a land trust is due to the death or incapacity of the former trustee, the declaration need not be signed by the former trustee and a copy of the death certificate or a statement that the former trustee is incapacitated or unable to serve must be attached to or included in the declaration, as applicable.

(c)(d) If the recorded instrument provides for the appointment of any successor trustee of a land trust and any successor trustee is appointed in accordance with the recorded instrument, no additional declarations of appointment of any successor trustee are required under this section.

(d) (e) Each successor land trustee appointed with respect to a land trust is fully vested with all the estate, properties, rights, powers, trusts, duties, and obligations of the predecessor land trustee, except that any successor land trustee of a land trust is not under any duty to inquire into the acts or omissions of a predecessor trustee and is not liable for any act or failure to act of a predecessor trustee. A person dealing

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with any successor trustee of a land trust pursuant to a declaration filed under this section is not obligated to inquire into or ascertain the authority of the successor trustee to act within or exercise the powers granted under the recorded instruments or any unrecorded trust agreement declarations or agreements.

- (e)(f) A land trust agreement may provide that the trustee of a land trust, when directed to do so by the holder of the power of direction or by the beneficiaries of the land trust or legal representatives of the beneficiaries, may convey the trust property directly to another trustee on behalf of the beneficiaries or to another representative named in such directive others named by the beneficiaries.
 - (10) TRUSTEE AS CREDITOR.-

- mortgage against in a beneficial interest in a land trust or by a mortgage on land trust property of a land trust, the validity or enforceability of the debt, security interest, or mortgage and the rights, remedies, powers, and duties of the creditor with respect to the debt or the security are not affected by the fact that the creditor and the trustee are the same person or entity, and the creditor may extend credit, obtain any necessary security interest or mortgage, and acquire and deal with the property comprising the security as though the creditor were not the trustee.
- (b) A trustee of a land trust does not breach a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries, and it is not evidence of a breach of any fiduciary duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries for

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a trustee to be or become a secured or unsecured creditor of the land trust, the beneficiary of the land trust, or a third party whose debt to such creditor is guaranteed by a beneficiary of the land trust.

- (11) NOTICES TO TRUSTEE.—Any notice required to be given to a trustee of a land trust regarding trust property by a person who is not a party to the trust agreement must identify the trust property to which the notice pertains or include the name and date of the land trust to which the notice pertains, if such information is shown on the recorded instrument for such trust property.
- (12) DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAW.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, chapter 736 does not apply to a land trust governed by this section.
- (a) A trust is not a land trust governed by this section if there is no recorded instrument that confers on the trustee the power and authority prescribed in s 689.073(1).
 - (b) For a trust created before July 1, 2013:
- 1. The trust is a land trust governed by this section if a recorded instrument confers on the trustee the power and authority described in s 689.073(1) and if:
- <u>a. The recorded instrument or the trust agreement</u> expressly provides that the trust is a land trust; or
- b. The intent of the parties that the trust be a land trust is discerned from the trust agreement or the recorded instrument;

without regard to whether the trustee's duties under the trust

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agreement are greater than those limited duties described in s. 689.071(2)(c).

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- 2. The trust is not a land trust governed by this section if:
 - <u>a. The recorded instrument or the trust agreement</u>

 <u>expressly provides that the trust is to be governed by chapter</u>

 736, or by any predecessor trust code or other law; or
 - b. The intent of the parties that the trust be governed by chapter 736, or by any predecessor trust code or other law, is discerned from the trust agreement or the recorded instrument;

without regard to whether the trustee's duties under the trust
agreement exceed those limited duties listed in s.

689.071(2)(c), and without consideration of any references in
the trust agreement to provisions of chapter 736 made applicable
to the trust by chapter 721, if the trust is a timeshare estate

- trust complying with s. 721.08(2)(c)4. or a vacation club trust complying with s. 721.53(1)(e).
 - 3. Solely for the purpose of determining the law governing a trust under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., the determination shall be made without consideration of any amendment to the trust agreement made on or after the effective date of this act, except as provided in paragraph (d).
 - 4. If the determination of whether a trust is a land trust governed by this section cannot be made under either subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., the determination shall be made under paragraph (c) as if the trust was created on or after the effective date of this act.

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(c) If a recorded instrument confers on the trustee the power and authority described in s. 689.073(1) and the trust was created on or after the effective date of this act, the trust shall be determined to be a land trust governed by this section only if the trustee's duties under the trust agreement, including any amendment made on or after such date, are no greater than those limited duties described in s. 689.071(2)(c).

- (d) If the trust agreement for a land trust created before the effective date of this act is amended on or after such date to add to or increase the duties of the trustee beyond the duties provided in the trust agreement as of the effective date of this act, the trust shall remain a land trust governed by this section only if the additional or increased duties of the trustee implemented by the amendment are no greater than those limited duties described in s. 689.071(2)(c).
- (13) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSITION RULE.—This section does not render ineffective any effective Uniform Commercial
 Code financing statement filed before the effective date of this act to perfect a security interest in a beneficial interest in a land trust that is determined to be real property as provided in subsection (6), but such a financing statement ceases to be effective at the earlier of 5 years after the effective date of this act or the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed, and the filing of a Uniform Commercial Code continuation statement after the effective date of this act does not continue the effectiveness of such a financing statement. The recording of a mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement, or other

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similar security document against such a beneficial interest that is real property in the public records specified in subsection (8)(c) continues the effectiveness and priority of a financing statement filed against such a beneficial interest before the effective date of this act if:

- (a) The recording of the security document in that county is effective to perfect a lien on such beneficial interest under subsection (8)(c);
- (b) The recorded security document identifies a financing statement filed before the effective date of this act by indicating the office in which the financing statement was filed and providing the dates of filing and the file numbers, if any, of the financing statement and of the most recent continuation statement filed with respect to the financing statement; and
- (c) The recorded security document indicates that such financing statement filed before the effective date of this act remains effective.

If no original security document bearing the debtor's signature is readily available for recording in the public records, a secured party may proceed under this subsection with such financing statement filed before the effective date of this act by recording a copy of a security document verified by the secured party as being a true and correct copy of an original authenticated by the debtor. This subsection does not apply to the perfection of a security interest in any beneficial interest in a land trust that is determined to be personal property under subsection (6).

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(14) REMEDIAL ACT.—This act is remedial in nature and shall be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate the intent and purposes hereinabove expressed.

(15) (12) EXCLUSION.—This act does not apply to any deed, mortgage, or other instrument to which s. 689.07 applies.

Section 3. Section 736.0102, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

736.0102 Scope.-

- (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, this code applies to express trusts, charitable or noncharitable, and trusts created pursuant to a law, judgment, or decree that requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express trust.
- (2) This code does not apply to constructive or resulting trusts; conservatorships; custodial arrangements pursuant to the Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act; business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries; common trust funds; land trusts under s. 689.071, except to the extent provided in s. 689.071(7); trusts created by the form of the account or by the deposit agreement at a financial institution; voting trusts; security arrangements; liquidation trusts; trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any kind; and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another.
- (3) This code does not apply to any land trust under s. 689.071, except to the extent provided in s. 689.071(7), s.

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721.08(2)(c)4. or s. 721.53(1)(e). A trust governed at its creation by chapter 736, former chapter 737, or any prior trust statute superseded or replaced by any provision of former chapter 737, is not a land trust regardless of any amendment or modification of the trust, any change in the assets held in the trust, or any continuing trust resulting from the distribution or retention in further trust of assets from the trust.

Section 4. The Division of Law Revision and Information is directed to replace the phrases "the effective date of this act" and "5 years after the effective date of this act" wherever they occur in this act with such dates.

Section 5. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

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
COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMIT	TEE	ACTION
ADOPTED		(Y/N)
ADOPTED AS AMENDED		(Y/N)
ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION		(Y/N)
FAILED TO ADOPT		(Y/N)
WITHDRAWN		(Y/N)
OTHER		


Committee/Subcommittee hearing bill: Civil Justice Subcommittee Representative Rodríguez, J. offered the following:

Amendment (with title amendment)

Remove lines 186-599 and insert: property to the trustee of a land trust and conferring upon the trustee the power and authority prescribed in s. 689.073(1), in this state, including, but not limited to, a leasehold or mortgagee interest, to any person or any corporation, bank, trust company, or other entity duly formed under the laws of its state of qualification, in which recorded instrument the person, corporation, bank, trust company, or other entity is designated "trustee" or "as trustee," whether or not reference is made in the recorded instrument to the beneficiaries of such land trust or to the trust agreement or any separate collateral unrecorded declarations or agreements, is effective to vest, and is hereby declared to have vested, in such trustee both legal and equitable title, and full rights of ownership, over the trust real property or interest therein, with full power and authority as granted and provided in the recorded instrument to deal in

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







Amendment No. 1 and with the <u>trust</u> property or interest therein or any part thereof. The recorded instrument does not itself create an entity, regardless of whether the relationship among the beneficiaries and the trustee is deemed to be an entity under other applicable law; provided, the recorded instrument confers on the trustee the power and authority to protect, to conserve, to sell, to lease, to encumber, or otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property described in the recorded instrument.

- (4) STATUTE OF USES INAPPLICABLE.—Section 689.09 and the statute of uses do not execute a land trust or vest the trust property in the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the land trust, notwithstanding any lack of duties on the part of the trustee or the otherwise passive nature of the land trust.
- (5) DOCTRINE OF MERGER INAPPLICABLE.—The doctrine of merger does not extinguish a land trust or vest the trust property in the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the land trust, regardless of whether the trustee is the sole beneficiary of the land trust.
- instrument or the trust agreement, as hereinabove provided, contains a provision defining and declaring the interests of beneficiaries of a land trust thereunder to be personal property only, such provision is shall be controlling for all purposes when such determination becomes an issue under the laws or in the courts of this state. If no such personal property designation appears in the recorded instrument or in the trust







Amendment No. 1 agreement, the interests of the land trust beneficiaries are real property.

- (7) TRUSTEE LIABILITY.—In addition to any other limitation on personal liability existing pursuant to statute or otherwise, the provisions of ss. 736.08125 and 736.1013 apply to the trustee of a land trust created pursuant to this section.
 - (8) LAND TRUST BENEFICIARIES.-

- (a) Except as provided in this section, the beneficiaries of a land trust are not liable, solely by being beneficiaries, under a judgment, decree, or order of court or in any other manner for a debt, obligation, or liability of the land trust.
- (b) Any beneficiary acting under the trust agreement of a land trust is not liable to the land trust's trustee or to any other beneficiary for the beneficiary's good faith reliance on the provisions of the trust agreement. A beneficiary's duties and liabilities under a land trust may be expanded or restricted in a trust agreement or beneficiary agreement.
- (b)1. If provided in the recorded instrument, in the trust agreement, or in a beneficiary agreement:
- a. A particular beneficiary may own the beneficial interest in a particular portion or parcel of the trust property of a land trust;
- b. A particular person may be the holder of the power of direction with respect to the trustee's actions concerning a particular portion or parcel of the trust property of a land trust; and
- c. The beneficiaries may own specified proportions or percentages of the beneficial interest in the trust property or



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
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
COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 in particular portions or parcels of the trust property of a land trust.

- 2. Multiple beneficiaries may own a beneficial interest in a land trust as tenants in common, joint tenants with right of survivorship, or tenants by the entireties.
- If a beneficial interest in a land trust is determined to be personal property as provided in subsection (6), chapter 679 applies to the perfection of any security interest in that a beneficial interest in a land trust. If a beneficial interest in a land trust is determined to be real property as provided in subsection (6), then to perfect a lien or security interest against that beneficial interest, the mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement, or other similar security document must be recorded in the public records of the county that is specified for such security documents in the recorded instrument or in a declaration of trust or memorandum of such declaration of trust recorded in the public records of the same county as the recorded instrument. If no county is so specified for recording such security documents, the proper county for recording such a security document against a beneficiary's interest in any trust property is the county where the trust property is located. The perfection of a lien or security interest in a beneficial interest in a land trust does not affect, attach to, or encumber the legal or equitable title of the trustee in the trust property and does not impair or diminish the authority of the trustee under the recorded instrument, and parties dealing with the trustee are not required to inquire into the terms of the







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Amendment No. 1 unrecorded trust agreement or any lien or security interest against a beneficial interest in the land trust.

- (d) The trustee's legal and equitable title to the trust property of a land trust is separate and distinct from the beneficial interest of a beneficiary in the land trust and in the trust property. A lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance attaching to the trustee's legal and equitable title to the trust property of a land trust does not attach to the beneficial interest of any beneficiary; and any lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance against a beneficiary or beneficial interest does not attach to the legal or equitable title of the trustee to the trust property held under a land trust, unless the lien, judgment, mortgage, security interest, or other encumbrance by its terms or by operation of other law attaches to both the interest of the trustee and the interest of such beneficiary. A beneficiary's duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted in a trust agreement or beneficiary agreement.
- (e) Any subsequent document appearing of record in which a beneficiary of a <u>land</u> trust transfers or encumbers <u>any</u> the beneficial interest in the <u>land</u> trust <u>does not transfer or encumber the legal or equitable title of the trustee to the trust property and does not diminish or impair the authority of the trustee under the terms of the recorded instrument. Parties dealing with the trustee <u>of a land trust</u> are not required to inquire into the terms of the unrecorded trust agreement.</u>
- (f) The An unrecorded trust agreement giving rise to a recorded instrument for a land trust may provide that one or



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COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 more persons or entities have the power to direct the trustee to convey property or interests, execute a mortgage, distribute proceeds of a sale or financing, and execute documents incidental to administration of the land trust. The power of direction, unless provided otherwise in the land trust agreement of the land trust, is conferred upon the holders of the power for the use and benefit of all holders of any beneficial interest in the land trust. In the absence of a provision in the land trust agreement of a land trust to the contrary, the power of direction shall be in accordance with the percentage of individual ownership. In exercising the power of direction, the holders of the power of direction are presumed to act in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all holders of any beneficial interest in the land trust, unless otherwise provided in the land trust agreement. A beneficial interest in a land trust is indefeasible, and the power of direction may not be exercised so as to alter, amend, revoke, terminate, defeat, or otherwise affect or change the enjoyment of any beneficial interest in a land trust.

(g) A <u>land</u> trust <u>relating to real estate</u> does not fail, and any use relating to <u>the trust property real estate</u> may not be defeated, because beneficiaries are not specified by name in the recorded <u>instrument deed of conveyance</u> to the trustee or because duties are not imposed upon the trustee. The power conferred by any recorded <u>instrument deed of conveyance</u> on a trustee <u>of a land trust</u> to sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of property described in the <u>recorded instrument deed</u> is effective, and a person dealing with the trustee <u>of a land trust</u>



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 is not required to inquire any further into the right of the trustee to act or the disposition of any proceeds.

- (h) The principal residence of a beneficiary shall be entitled to the homestead tax exemption even if the homestead is held by a trustee in a land trust, provided the beneficiary qualifies for the homestead exemption under chapter 196.
- (i) In a foreclosure against trust property or other litigation affecting the title to trust property of a land trust, the appointment of a guardian ad litem is not necessary to represent the interest of any beneficiary.
 - (9) SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE.

(a) The provisions of s. 736.0705 relating to the resignation of a trustee do not apply to the appointment of a successor trustee under this section.

(a) (b) If the recorded instrument and the unrecorded land trust agreement are silent as to the appointment of a successor trustee of a land trust in the event of the death, incapacity, resignation, or termination due to dissolution of a land trustee or if a land trustee is unable to serve as trustee of a land trust, one or more persons or entities having the power of direction of the land trust agreement may appoint a successor trustee or trustees of the land trust by filing a declaration of appointment of a successor trustee or trustees in the public records of office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which the trust property is located. The declaration must be signed by a beneficiary or beneficiaries of the land trust and by the each successor trustee or trustees, must be acknowledged



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 in the manner provided for acknowledgment of deeds, and must contain:

- 1. The legal description of the trust property.
- 2. The name and address of the former trustee.
- 3. The name and address of $\underline{\text{the}}$ each successor trustee $\underline{\text{or}}$ $\underline{\text{trustees}}$.
- 4. A statement that each successor trustee has been appointed by one or more persons or entities having the power of direction of the land trust appointed the successor trustee or trustees, together with an acceptance of appointment by the each successor trustee or trustees.

(b) (e) If the recorded instrument is silent as to the appointment of a successor trustee or trustees of a land trust but an unrecorded land trust agreement provides for the appointment of a successor trustee or trustees in the event of the death, incapacity, resignation, or termination due to dissolution of the land trustee, of a land trust, then upon the appointment of any successor trustee pursuant to the terms of the unrecorded land trust agreement, the each successor trustee or trustees shall file a declaration of appointment of a successor trustee in the public records of office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which the trust property is located. The declaration must be signed by both the former trustee and the each successor trustee or trustees, must be acknowledged in the manner provided for acknowledgment of deeds, and must contain:

- 1. The legal description of the trust property.
- 2. The name and address of the former trustee.



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

- 3. The name and address of the successor trustee <u>or</u> trustees.
- 4. A statement of resignation by the former trustee and a statement of acceptance of appointment by $\underline{\text{the}}$ each successor trustee or trustees.
- 5. A statement that the each successor trustee or trustees were was duly appointed under the terms of the unrecorded land trust agreement.

If the appointment of any successor trustee of a land trust is due to the death or incapacity of the former trustee, the declaration need not be signed by the former trustee and a copy of the death certificate or a statement that the former trustee is incapacitated or unable to serve must be attached to or included in the declaration, as applicable.

(c)(d) If the recorded instrument provides for the appointment of any successor trustee of a land trust and any successor trustee is appointed in accordance with the recorded instrument, no additional declarations of appointment of any successor trustee are required under this section.

(d) (e) Each successor land trustee appointed with respect to a land trust is fully vested with all the estate, properties, rights, powers, trusts, duties, and obligations of the predecessor land trustee, except that any successor land trustee of a land trust is not under any duty to inquire into the acts or omissions of a predecessor trustee and is not liable for any act or failure to act of a predecessor trustee. A person dealing with any successor trustee of a land trust pursuant to a



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 declaration filed under this section is not obligated to inquire into or ascertain the authority of the successor trustee to act within or exercise the powers granted under the recorded instruments or any unrecorded trust agreement declarations or agreements.

- (e)(f) A land trust agreement may provide that the trustee of a land trust, when directed to do so by the holder of the power of direction or by the beneficiaries of the land trust or legal representatives of the beneficiaries, may convey the trust property directly to another trustee on behalf of the beneficiaries or to another representative named in such directive others named by the beneficiaries.
 - (10) TRUSTEE AS CREDITOR.-
- (a) If a debt is secured by a security interest or mortgage against in a beneficial interest in a land trust or by a mortgage on land trust property of a land trust, the validity or enforceability of the debt, security interest, or mortgage and the rights, remedies, powers, and duties of the creditor with respect to the debt or the security are not affected by the fact that the creditor and the trustee are the same person or entity, and the creditor may extend credit, obtain any necessary security interest or mortgage, and acquire and deal with the property comprising the security as though the creditor were not the trustee.
- (b) A trustee of a land trust does not breach a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries, and it is not evidence of a breach of any fiduciary duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries for a trustee to be or become a secured or unsecured creditor of the



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 land trust, the beneficiary of the land trust, or a third party whose debt to such creditor is guaranteed by a beneficiary of the land trust.

- (11) NOTICES TO TRUSTEE.—Any notice required to be given to a trustee of a land trust regarding trust property by a person who is not a party to the trust agreement must identify the trust property to which the notice pertains or include the name and date of the land trust to which the notice pertains, if such information is shown on the recorded instrument for such trust property.
- (12) DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAW.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, chapter 736 does not apply to a land trust governed by this section.
- (a) A trust is not a land trust governed by this section if there is no recorded instrument that confers on the trustee the power and authority prescribed in s 689.073(1).
- (b) For a trust created before the effective date of this act:
- 1. The trust is a land trust governed by this section if a recorded instrument confers on the trustee the power and authority described in s 689.073(1) and if:
- a. The recorded instrument or the trust agreement expressly provides that the trust is a land trust; or
- b. The intent of the parties that the trust be a land trust is discerned from the trust agreement or the recorded instrument;





Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1
without regard to whether the trustee's duties under the trust
agreement are greater than those limited duties described in s.
689.071(2)(c).
2 The trust is not a land trust governed by this section

- <u>2.</u> The trust is not a land trust governed by this section <u>if:</u>
- a. The recorded instrument or the trust agreement expressly provides that the trust is to be governed by chapter 736, or by any predecessor trust code or other trust law other than this section; or
- b. The intent of the parties that the trust be governed by chapter 736, or by any predecessor trust code or other trust law other than this section, is discerned from the trust agreement or the recorded instrument;

without regard to whether the trustee's duties under the trust agreement are greater than those limited duties listed in s.

689.071(2)(c), and without consideration of any references in the trust agreement to provisions of chapter 736 made applicable to the trust by chapter 721, if the trust is a timeshare estate trust complying with s. 721.08(2)(c)4. or a vacation club trust complying with s. 721.53(1)(e).

- 3. Solely for the purpose of determining the law governing a trust under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., the determination shall be made without consideration of any amendment to the trust agreement made on or after the effective date of this act, except as provided in paragraph (d).
- 4. If the determination of whether a trust is a land trust governed by this section cannot be made under either



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Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

Amendment No. 1
subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., the determination shall be
made under paragraph (c) as if the trust was created on or after
the effective date of this act.

- (c) If a recorded instrument confers on the trustee the power and authority described in s. 689.073(1) and the trust was created on or after the effective date of this act, the trust shall be determined to be a land trust governed by this section only if the trustee's duties under the trust agreement, including any amendment made on or after such date, are greater than those limited duties described in s. 689.071(2)(c).
- (d) If the trust agreement for a land trust created before the effective date of this act is amended on or after such date to add to or increase the duties of the trustee beyond the duties provided in the trust agreement as of the effective date of this act, the trust shall remain a land trust governed by this section only if the additional or increased duties of the trustee implemented by the amendment are greater than those limited duties described in s. 689.071(2)(c).
- (13) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSITION RULE.—This section does not render ineffective any effective Uniform Commercial Code financing statement filed before July 1, 2014, to perfect a security interest in a beneficial interest in a land trust that is determined to be real property as provided in subsection (6), but such a financing statement ceases to be effective at the earlier of July 1, 2019, or the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed, and the filing of a Uniform Commercial Code continuation statement after July 1, 2014, does



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

	Amendment No. 1
353	not continue the effectiveness of such a financing statement.
354	The recording of a mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement,
355	or other similar security document against such a beneficial
356	interest that is real property in the public records specified
357	in subsection (8)(c) continues the effectiveness and priority of
358	a financing statement filed against such a beneficial interest
359	before July 1, 2014, if:
360	(a) The recording of the security document in that county
361	is effective to perfect a lien on such beneficial interest under
362	subsection (8)(c);
363	(b) The recorded security document identifies a financing
364	statement filed before July 1, 2014, by indicating the office in
365	which the financing statement was filed and providing the dates
366	of filing and the file numbers, if any, of the financing
367	statement and of the most recent continuation statement filed
368	with respect to the financing statement; and
369	(c) The recorded security document indicates that such
370	financing statement filed before July 1, 2014, remains
371	effective.
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373	If no original security document bearing the debtor's signature

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
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If no original security document bearing the debtor's signature is readily available for recording in the public records, a secured party may proceed under this subsection with such financing statement filed before July 1, 2014, by recording a copy of a security document verified by the secured party as being a true and correct copy of an original authenticated by the debtor. This subsection does not apply to the perfection of





Bill No. HB 229 (2013)

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a sec	curi	ty	interest	in	any	benefic	cial	inter	est	<u>in</u>	a :	land	tru	st
that	is	det	ermined	to 1	be pe	ersonal	prop	erty	unde	r s	ub	secti	on	(6).

- (14) (11) REMEDIAL ACT.—This act is remedial in nature and shall be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate the intent and purposes hereinabove expressed.
- (15)(12) EXCLUSION.—This act does not apply to any deed, mortgage, or other instrument to which s. 689.07 applies.
- Section 3. Section 736.0102, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

736.0102 Scope.-

- (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, this code applies to express trusts, charitable or noncharitable, and trusts created pursuant to a law, judgment, or decree that requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express trust.
- (2) This code does not apply to constructive or resulting trusts; conservatorships; custodial arrangements pursuant to the Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act; business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries; common trust funds; land trusts under s. 689.071, except to the extent provided in s. 689.071(7); trusts created by the form of the account or by the deposit agreement at a financial institution; voting trusts; security arrangements; liquidation trusts; trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any kind; and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another.



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

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(3) This code does not apply to any land trust under s.
689.071, except to the extent provided in s. 689.071(7), s.
721.08(2)(c)4. or s. 721.53(1)(e). A trust governed at its
creation by chapter 736, former chapter 737, or any prior trust
statute superseded or replaced by any provision of former
chapter 737, is not a land trust regardless of any amendment or
modification of the trust, any change in the assets held in the
trust, or any continuing trust resulting from the distribution
or retention in further trust of assets from the trust.

Section 4. The Division of Law Revision and Information is directed to replace the phrase "the effective date of this act" wherever it occurs in this act with such date.

TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove lines 3-5 and insert:

F.S.; transferring and renumbering portions of s. 689.071, F.S.; providing title estoppel language for vesting full title in trustees; providing

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS

BILL #:

HB 231

Dissolution of Marriage

SPONSOR(S): Workman and others

TIED BILLS: None IDEN./SIM. BILLS:

SB 718

REFERENCE	ACTION	ANALYST	STAFF DIRECTOR or BUDGET/POLICY CHIEF
1) Civil Justice Subcommittee		Ward ZOV	Bond V 3
2) Judiciary Committee			

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

Alimony provides financial support to a financially dependent former spouse. The primary elements to determine entitlement are need and the ability to pay, but the statutes and case law impose many more criteria. There are four different types of alimony; bridge-the-gap alimony, rehabilitative alimony, durational alimony, and permanent alimony. An award of alimony may be modified or terminated early in certain circumstances.

The bill makes a number of changes to current law on alimony and dissolution of marriage. The bill:

- Eliminates permanent alimony.
- Eliminates spousal support unconnected to dissolution of marriage.
- Eliminates consideration of the standard of living established during the marriage as a factor in determining alimony.
- Eliminates the court's ability to impose a fine for non-payment of support obligations.
- Creates presumptions for earning ability imputed to an obligee.
- Limits the authority of a court to consider adultery when determining alimony.
- Requires written findings justifying factors regarding an alimony award or modification.
- Creates evidentiary thresholds for certain awards of alimony or modification.
- Creates a presumption that the parties will have a lower standard of living after divorce.
- Limits alimony based on formulas that take into account relative incomes and the length of the marriage.
- Creates a rebuttable presumption that alimony terminates upon retirement of the obligor.
- Creates a rebuttable presumption that alimony terminates upon the obligee reaching retirement age.
- Shifts the burden of proof regarding the need for alimony to the obligee in certain circumstances.
- Prohibits considering the income or assets of a new spouse of the obligor.
- Prohibits modification of alimony based solely on a reduction in child support.
- Allows bifurcation of a dissolution case if pending more than 180 days, and requires bifurcation if pending over 365 days.
- Allows modification or termination of existing alimony awards.
- Provides a schedule for review of existing awards of alimony.

This bill does not appear to have a fiscal impact on state or local governments.

The bill provides an effective date of July 1, 2013.

FULL ANALYSIS

I. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

A. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

In general, alimony provides support to a financially dependent former spouse.¹ Alimony may be awarded to either party in a dissolution of marriage case,² and may be awarded in certain other cases. The judgment awarding alimony may be based upon the own court's findings of fact, or by an underlying agreement of the parties that is approved by the court.³ Alimony is determined by considering both the need of the recipient and the ability to pay of the other party.⁴ Alimony is not appropriate when the requesting spouse has no need for support or when the other spouse does not have the ability to pay.⁵

While there is some statutory guidance regarding alimony, much of the law on alimony is common law (that is, established through case precedent). The leading case on alimony is *Canakaris v. Canakaris*,⁶ a 1980 case that set forth many general concepts of alimony but also confirmed that ultimately the setting of alimony is a matter within the broad discretion of a trial court. Writing in favor of broad discretion, the Supreme Court said:

Dissolution proceedings present a trial judge with the difficult problem of apportioning assets acquired by the parties and providing necessary support. The judge possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the parties and has available various remedies to accomplish this purpose, including lump sum alimony, permanent periodic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, child support, a vested special equity in property, and an award of exclusive possession of property. As considered by the trial court, these remedies are interrelated; to the extent of their eventual use, the remedies are part of one overall scheme.⁷

However, the court noted the problem with such broad discretion:

The discretionary power that is exercised by a trial judge is not, however, without limitation, and both appellate and trial judges should recognize the concern which arises from substantial disparities in domestic judgments resulting from basically similar factual circumstances. The appellate courts have not been helpful in this regard. Our decisions and those of the district courts are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. The trial court's discretionary power is subject only to the test of reasonableness, but that test requires a determination of whether there is logic and justification for the result. The trial courts' discretionary power was never intended to be exercised in accordance with whim or caprice of the judge nor in an inconsistent manner. Judges dealing with cases essentially alike should reach the same result. Different results reached from substantially the same facts comport with neither logic nor reasonableness.⁸

In the 33 years since *Canakaris*, little has changed in alimony law. While some statutory guidance has been added and case law has somewhat narrowed judicial discretion, a trial court still has broad

¹ Victoria Ho & Jennifer Johnson, Overview of Florida Alimony Law, 78 Fla.B.J. 71, 71 (Oct. 2004).

² Section 61.08(2), F.S.

³ Section 61.14(1)(a), F.S.

See s. 61.08(2), F.S.; Payne v. Payne, 88 So.3d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

⁵ Section 61.08(2), F.S.

⁶ Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)

⁷ Id. at 1202.

⁸ Id. at 1203.

discretion in setting the amount and term of alimony. Expressing his frustration with the concept of broad discretion, one appellate judge wrote in 2002:

I write, however, to express my view that broad discretion in the award of alimony is no longer justifiable and should be discarded in favor of guidelines, if not an outright rule.⁹

Changes to Definitions Regarding Alimony

<u>Definitions Regarding the Duration of the Marriage</u>

The types of alimony available depend on duration of the marriage. Current law provides a rebuttable presumption that:

- A long-term marriage has a duration of 17 years or more.
- A moderate-term marriage is between 7 and 17 years.
- A short-term marriage is less than 7 years.¹⁰

These presumptions related to the length of a marriage were first enacted in statute in 2010,¹¹ and were based on definitions described by prior case law. This bill changes the presumptions to a formula, changes terminology, and changes marriage durations as follows:

- A "long-term marriage" means a marriage of more than 20 years.
- A "mid-term marriage" means a marriage of between 10 and 20 years.
- A "short-term marriage" means a marriage of less than 10 years.

Other Definitions Created By This Bill

The terms alimony and net income are not defined by current law. The bill adds:

- "Alimony" is defined as a court ordered payment of support.
- "Net income" means the amount considered by the court for child support purposes.¹³

The definition of alimony reflects existing law and thus makes no change. The definition of net income limits the term and requires a court to use the same income for consideration of alimony as the court uses in determining child support.

Establishment of Alimony - Changes by Type of Alimony

Current statutory law provides for four types of alimony post-dissolution: bridge-the-gap alimony, ¹⁴ rehabilitative alimony, ¹⁵ durational alimony, ¹⁶ and permanent alimony. ¹⁷

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⁹ Bacon v. Bacon, 819 So.2d 950, 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(Farmer, J., concurring).

¹⁰ Section 61.08(4), F.S.

¹¹ Section 1 of ch. 2010-199, L.O.F.

¹² This change to 10 years conforms statutory law to some case law prior to the adoption of the 7 year standard for short term marriage. See *Jaffy v. Jaffy*, 965 So.2d 825, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); *Iribar v. Iribar*, 510 So.2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987). But see *Yitzhari v. Yitzhari*, 906 So.2d 1250, 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ("A nine-year marriage has been held to fall into the 'gray area' in which '[t]here is no presumption for or against permanent alimony.' " [emphasis supplied, citations omitted]); *Adinolfe v. Adinolfe*, 718 So.2d 369, 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (nine year marriage "may very well be in the 'gray area'").

¹³ See Section 61.30, F.S.

¹⁴ Section 61.08(5), F.S.

¹⁵ Section 61.08(6), F.S.

¹⁶ Section 61.08(7), F.S. See also fn. 37, infra.

- Bridge-the-gap alimony may be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single.¹⁸
- Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded to assist a party in establishing the capacity for selfsupport through either the redevelopment of previous skills or the acquisition of employment skills.¹⁹
- Durational alimony may be awarded to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a marriage of short or moderate duration.
- Permanent alimony may be awarded to provide for the necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet them following dissolution of marriage.

Permanent Alimony

Current law allows for an award of permanent alimony.²⁰ Permanent alimony "may be awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage."²¹ Permanent alimony continues until death of the obligor or obligee, remarriage of the obligee, or termination by a court (on a petition for modification).²² In order to award permanent alimony the court must include a finding that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the parties.²³ Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of:

- Long duration if the award is appropriate upon consideration of the factors in s. 61.08(2), F.S.;
- Moderate duration if the award is based upon clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors in s. 61.08(2), F.S.; or
- Short duration if there are written findings of exceptional circumstances.

The bill ends permanent alimony.

Durational Alimony

Durational alimony²⁴ provides a party with assistance following dissolution of a marriage. Like permanent alimony, it terminates upon the death of either party or upon remarriage of the recipient;²⁵ but unlike permanent alimony it ends after a fixed duration of time. It may also terminate upon a change in circumstances²⁶ or when the recipient lives with another in a "supportive relationship,"²⁷ and may also be extended on a petition for modification. The bill:

- Provides that durational alimony may be awarded for a short-term, mid-term, or long-term marriage.
- Provides that an award of durational alimony must contain written findings that no other form of alimony is appropriate.
- Requires modification or termination upon the existence of a supportive relationship.

¹⁷ Section 61.08(8), F.S.

¹⁸ Section 60.08(5), F.S.

¹⁹ Section 60.08(6)(a), F.S.

²⁰ Section 61.08, F.S.

²¹ Section 61.08(8), F.S.

²² Section 61.08(8), F.S.

²³ Section 61.08(8), F.S.

²⁴ "The 2010 amendments [to ch. 61, F.S.], created durational alimony, an intermediate form of alimony between bridge-the-gap and permanent alimony." *Nousari v. Nousari*, 94 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

²⁵ Section 61.08(7), F.S.

²⁶ Sections 61.08(7) and 61.14(1)(a), F.S.

²⁷ Section 61.14(1)(b)1, F.S. **STORAGE NAME**: h0231.CJS.DOCX

Limits the duration of durational alimony to 50 percent of the length of the marriage, unless the recipient proves by clear and convincing evidence of need for a longer time period.

Rehabilitative Alimony and Bridge-the-Gap Alimony

The bill makes no change that directly affects the definition of or general concepts governing either rehabilitative alimony or bridge-the-gap alimony. However, like durational alimony, the bill does alter qualifications for and the legal standards affecting an initial claim for, or modification of, such an award, as further explained below.

Multiple Types of Alimony

Current law provides that the court may award the four different types of alimony individually or in combination.²⁸ This bill provides that the three remaining forms of alimony may be awarded in combination only when the goal is to achieve rehabilitation.

Establishment of Alimony - Changes by Duration of Marriage

Short-Term Marriage

Under current law, all forms of alimony may be awarded after a short-term marriage. However, permanent alimony may only be awarded upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances" and a showing that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable. The bill:

- Creates a presumption against any award of alimony following a short-term marriage. unless need is shown by clear and convincing evidence.
- Requires that need for alimony be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
- Limits any award of alimony after a short-term marriage to the lesser of 50 percent of the difference between the net incomes, or 20 percent of the obligor's net income.
- Repeals authority for an award of permanent alimony.
- Requires imputation of income (see below).

Mid-Term Marriage

Under current law, all forms of alimony may be awarded after a mid-term marriage. However, permanent alimony may only be awarded upon a showing that such award is "appropriate" based on clear and convincing evidence and a showing that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable. The bill:

- Provides that there is no presumption in favor of or against an award of alimony following a midterm marriage.
- Limits alimony to the lesser of 50 percent of the difference between the net incomes of the parties, or an amount based on a sliding scale formula (ranging from 20% to 30%) that changes based on the number of years of the marriage.
- Provides a 10 percentage point increase in the formula in favor of a recipient who is disabled or over 65 years of age. Disability must be proved by a letter from the Social Security Administration of total disability; and age must be proved by an original birth certificate or Florida driver license.
- Repeals authority for an award of permanent alimony.
- Requires imputation of income (see below).

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²⁸ Section 61.08, F.S.

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Long-Term Marriage

Under current law, all forms of alimony may be awarded after a long-term marriage. However, permanent alimony may only be awarded upon a showing that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable. The bill:

- Creates a presumption in favor of an award of alimony that may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that there is no need for alimony.
- Limits alimony to the lesser of 50 percent of the difference between the net incomes of the parties, or an amount based on a sliding scale formula (ranging from 31% to 33%) that changes based on the number of years of the marriage.
- Provides a 10 percentage point increase in the formula in favor of a recipient who is disabled or over 65 years of age. Disability must be proved by a letter from the Social Security Administration of total disability, and age must be proved by an original birth certificate or Florida driver license.
- Repeals authority for an award of permanent alimony.

Factors Applicable to All Alimony Awards

Factors - In General

Current statutory factors that a court must consider in awarding alimony include:²⁹

- The standard of living established during the marriage.
- The duration of the marriage.
- The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
- The financial resources of each party, including the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
- The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
- The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.
- The responsibility each party will have for minor children they have in common.
- The tax consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable nondeductible payment.
- All sources of income available to either party, including income available through investments of any asset held by that party.
- Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.

The bill:

- Eliminates consideration of the standard of living established during the marriage as a criterion in awarding alimony.
- Limits reference to non-marital assets used during the marriage unless such assets were relied upon by the parties.
- Requires the court to consider the standard of living the parties will have after application of the alimony award.

²⁹ Section 61.08(2), F.S. **DATE**: 2/11/2013

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- Adds a rebuttable presumption that the standard of living of both parties will be lower after dissolution, which presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Requires the court to specifically identify any other factor used in making the alimony award, and requires the court to list all findings of fact supporting that factor.

The bill also makes numerous grammatical and style changes to the list of statutory factors which do not appear to affect alimony awards.³⁰

Adultery

Currently the court may consider the adultery of either party and the circumstances surrounding it in determining an award of alimony.³¹ Case law provides that adultery is not a bar to receipt of alimony³² and marital misconduct may not be used as a basis for alimony unless the misconduct causes a depletion of marital assets.³³

The bill limits the court's consideration of adultery by providing that it may be considered only if the adultery caused significant depletion of marital assets or reduction in marital income.

Relative Incomes

Currently, an award of alimony may not leave the obligor with significantly less net income than the net income of the recipient without written findings of exceptional circumstances.³⁴ This provision is repealed and replaced with a provision providing that alimony may not be awarded to a party with an equal or greater monthly net income than the obligor.

Imputed Income

Under current law, the court has the discretion to impute income in appropriate circumstances.³⁵ Imputed income can be thought of as the income that the party should be earning. If the trial court determines that a spouse's past income has declined due to voluntary action, the court may impute a higher income based on "history, qualifications, and prevailing wages." The trial court's imputation of income must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.³⁷

³⁰ For instance, the paragraph on tax treatment removes the clause regarding designation of alimony as nontaxable and substitutes a clause requiring that an alimony award be consistent with state and federal tax laws. Federal tax laws provide that, in general, alimony is deductible by the obligor and is income to the recipient, which is usually the preferable strategy to minimize tax burdens. However, federal tax law allows the court order awarding alimony to designate that a portion or all of the alimony is not deductible by the obligor and thus not income to the recipient. Thus, this change in language has no apparent legal consequence. See generally Publication 17 by the IRS, last accessed on February 11, 2013 at: http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/ch18.html.

³¹ Section 61.08(1), F.S.

³² See Coltea v. Coltea, 856 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA).

³³ See Noah v. Noah, 491 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the trial court erred in distributing virtually all assets to the wife on the basis of her husband's adultery where there was no evidence that the adultery depleted the family resources or that the emotional devastation visited on the wife translated into her having a greater financial need).

³⁴ Section 61.08(9), F.S.

Section 61.08(2)(c), F.S., provides that the court may look to the "earning capacities" of both parties.

³⁶ Konsoulas v. Konsoulas, 904 So.2d 440, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

³⁷ Zarycki-Weig v. Weig, 25 So.3d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

As applied to short-term and mid-term marriages, the bill prohibits imputation of Social Security retirement benefits to an obligor and requires imputation of income to the obligee as follows:

- An obligee who is unemployed for less than one year prior to the filing of a petition for dissolution has 90% of previous income imputed.
- An obligee who is unemployed between 1 and 2 years prior to the filing of the petition has 80% of previous income imputed.
- An obligee who is unemployed between 2 and 3 years prior to the filing of the petition has 70% of previous income imputed.
- An obligee who is unemployed between 3 and 4 years prior to the filing of a petition for dissolution has 60% of previous income imputed.
- An obligee who is unemployed between 4 and 5 years prior to the filing of a petition for dissolution has 50% of previous income imputed.
- An obligee who is unemployed more than 5 years prior to the filing of a petition for dissolution has 40% of previous income imputed, or the current minimum wage, whichever is greater.

However, the court must reduce these imputations if the obligee proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she does not have the ability to earn the imputed income through reasonable means.

Effect of Property Distribution and Child Support Awards on Alimony

Currently alimony is determined by settlement agreement, or statutory factors. Child support may be determined by agreement or by the court based upon findings of fact.³⁸ One factor in setting alimony is "any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties."³⁹ Based on this factor, case law provides that alimony may be used to balance the inequities resulting from property disposition so long as there is a demonstrated ability to pay⁴⁰ and provides that the determination of alimony may also be based on obligations to dependents.⁴¹

The bill adds a new provision that the determination of equitable distribution or child support may affect an obligee's need for alimony or an obligor's ability to pay alimony. The court may offset or otherwise consider an alimony obligation in determining equitable distribution or child support under this chapter. This appears to codify current law.

Requirements of an Alimony Award

Findings of Fact

Case law requires that an award of alimony which is not based upon a settlement must include findings of fact relating the award to the factors in the statute which must be considered by the court. Failure to include findings of fact as required by section 61.08 is reversible error. Further, It he purpose of these findings is to assist the appellate court in providing a meaningful review. Statutory law also requires the court to make findings of fact to support its award of alimony. The bill adds to statutes the following requirements regarding written findings of fact:

³⁸ *Griffith v. Griffith*, 860 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

³⁹ Section 61.08(2)(j), F.S.

⁴⁰ Hamlet v. Hamlet, 583 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1991); Rizer v. Rizer, 691 So.2d 541 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1997).

⁴¹ Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980).

⁴² Section 61.08(1), F.S.

⁴³ Farley v. Farley, 800 So.2d 710, 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

⁴⁴ Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), citing Milo v. Milo, 718 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

⁴⁵ Section 61.08(1), F.S.

- The order must determine the duration of the alimony and the type awarded.
- If the court utilizes any factor other than the statutory factors for an award of alimony, the factor must be specifically identified, together with findings of fact justifying the application of the factor
- The order must include written findings that the obligor party has the ability to pay and that the party seeking alimony has met the burden of proof.

Burden of Proof

The bill also incorporates current law into statute by providing that the burden of proof to show need is on the party seeking alimony.

Enforcement of an Alimony Award

Security for an Alimony Award

Currently the court may protect an alimony award by requiring the obligor to purchase life insurance or post a bond. The bill:

- Provides that any requirement to purchase life insurance must be for a decreasing term policy.
- Requires that the policy may only be awarded upon a showing of special circumstances, with the court making specific evidentiary findings on the cost and impact on the party paying for the policy.
- Provides that such security may be modified if the underlying alimony award is modified.

Contempt Proceedings

Currently failure to comply with a court order to pay alimony may subject an obligor to the penalties of civil contempt, including fines. ⁴⁶ Further, "Fines resulting from civil contempt orders can only be reduced if the violator complies with the order that caused the fines." The bill:

- Precludes a court in a contempt proceeding from awarding more than the monthly alimony obligation of the obligor, for the number of months owed.
- Codifies that the court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a contempt proceeding.

Modification of an Alimony Award

Modification - In General

Currently either party may request modification of an award of alimony, either agreed upon or based upon a court order. Current law requires the moving party to show a substantial change in circumstances of one of the parties to justify the modification. The court in an action for modification has discretion to make an equitable award based upon the current circumstances of the parties. A modification order may be retroactive to the date of the filing of the action, or the filing of the petition for modification, as equity requires. A marital settlement agreement becomes a contractual duty which, when endorsed by court order, may not be set aside or revisited, according to principles of collateral

⁴⁹ *Id*.

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⁴⁶ *Murphy v. Evans*, 96 So. 3d 1034 (Fia. 3d DCA 2012).

⁴⁷ Id., citing to Politz v. Booth, 910 So.2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

⁴⁸ Section 61.14(1), F.S.

estoppel and res judicata.⁵⁰ "Florida courts do not take lightly agreements made by husband and wife concerning spousal support. A marital settlement agreement as to alimony or property rights which is entered before the dissolution of marriage is binding upon the parties.' "⁵¹ The bill:

- Codifies the requirement that there be a substantial change in circumstances to justify a modification of an alimony award.
- Limits modification based on an increase in an obligor's income to provide that an increase is
 not considered permanent unless it has been maintained for 2 years and will be sustained in the
 future.

Modification of Alimony Based on the Existence of a Supportive Relationship

Currently a court may reduce or terminate an award of alimony based on its specific written findings that since the award of alimony the spouse receiving alimony has entered into a supportive relationship with another person with whom he or she is living.⁵² The bill:

- Provides that the court must reduce or terminate the alimony award because of the supportive relationship, except upon a showing by "clear and convincing evidence" that the need for alimony has not been reduced by the relationship.
- Removes the requirement that the obligee spouse is residing with the other person.
- Provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that any modification or termination based on a supportive relationship is retroactive to the date of filing the petition.
- Adds a provision for attorney's fees in the event of unreasonable requests for modification of an existing award.
- Adds a new provision providing that a termination of alimony based upon a supporting
 relationship ends the court's jurisdiction to change the order again, which has the effect of
 making termination of alimony based on a supportive relationship a permanent end to alimony
 in that case.

Modification Based on Income of a New Spouse; Effect of Child Support Change

Currently if an obligor remarries or resides with another person who provides support, the income and assets of the new spouse or co-habitant may not be considered in a modification hearing.⁵³ The bill codifies this law to provide that if an obligor remarries or resides with another person, the income and assets of the obligor's spouse or person with whom the obligor resides may not be considered in a modification action regarding such obligor. The bill also adds that if child support and alimony were set at the same time, a future reduction in the amount of child support is not grounds for modification of the related alimony award.

Modification or Termination of Alimony Based on Retirement

Current law provides that retirement of the obligor is a substantial change in circumstances that may warrant the filing of a petition to modify alimony.⁵⁴ There are no statutory standards relating to modification or termination of alimony based on retirement, it is strictly up to the trial court's discretion. The bill provides for modification or termination of an alimony award based on retirement.

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⁵⁰ See, eg., *Perry v. Perry*, 976 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

⁵¹ Griffith v. Griffith, 860 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), citing Dowie v. Dowie, 668 So.2d 290, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

⁵² Section 61.14(1)(b)1., F.S.

⁵³ Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)

⁵⁴ Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1992).

Age of Obligee

The bill provides that alimony terminates when the obligee reaches full retirement age under the Social Security law. However, this may be overcome by the obligee if he or she proves by clear and convincing evidence that the need for alimony exists even after receipt of the Social Security benefits and that the obligor's ability to pay has not diminished.

Age or Retirement of the Obligor

Currently, if an obligor is unemployed or underemployed, the court in an enforcement proceeding may order the obligor to seek employment or participate in training to seek employment, among other tasks, in order to avoid contempt of court. 55 Case law holds that retirement is a change in circumstances that may be considered together with other factors in a petition to modify an alimony award. 56 The bill:

- Provides that the point at which an obligor reaching a "reasonable retirement age for his or her profession" and who has actually retired, is a substantial change in circumstances as a matter of law.
- Provides that reaching the retirement age for full Social Security payments is a substantial change in circumstances.
- Provides that a court, when reviewing the retirement of an obligor who has not reached normal or Social Security age for retirement, must consider the age and health of the obligor, the type of work, and the normal retirement age for that type of work for early retirement.
- Provides that in anticipation of retirement, the obligor may file a petition for termination or modification of the alimony award effective upon the retirement date, or the date that the obligor reaches full retirement age for full Social Security benefits.
- Provides that the court must terminate or reduce the alimony award upon retirement, unless the obligee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the need continues and the ability to pay of the obligor remains the same.

Alimony Outside of a Dissolution of Marriage Action

Currently alimony and child support may be sought without filing a dissolution proceeding.⁵⁷ Although the term is not used in Florida law, this effectively creates what many other states refer to as a legal separation. The bill eliminates the statutory authority for an award of alimony outside of an action for dissolution of marriage and separately prohibits alimony outside of a dissolution of marriage action. This bill does not affect the ability to petition for child support unconnected with dissolution.

The language making this change at lines 102-103 provides that "[a]limony may not be awarded in any other action." This provision appears to have the effect of prohibiting an award of alimony connected to an action for annulment of marriage.

Other Changes to Dissolution of Marriage Laws

Alimony Pendente Lite and Suit Money

Alimony pendente lite is temporary alimony awarded during pendency of a dissolution of marriage action to furnish a dependent spouse with a means of living so he or she may not become a charge upon the state while the case is being adjudicated. 58 The court may also order that one party pay for

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⁵⁵ Section 61.14(5)(b), F.S. ⁵⁶ *Pimm v. Pimm*, 601 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1992).

Section 61.09, F.S.

⁵⁸ Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1964).

the legal costs of the case, called "suit money." ⁵⁹ Currently in every proceeding for dissolution, a party may claim alimony pendente lite and suit money. ⁶⁰ The court may grant either or both, so long as the award is "reasonable." ⁶¹ By simply referring to "reasonable," current law does not limit alimony pendent lite or provide any standard for an award.

The bill requires that alimony pendente lite be calculated pursuant to the same statutory standards as any other award of alimony. 62

Bifuration of Dissolution of Marriage Case

Currently the court may, upon a showing that injustice would result from delay, enter a judgment of dissolution, reserving jurisdiction to determine other matters such as property division and child support. This is called "bifurcation" of the action. A party might petition the court for bifurcation where the party would like to expedite the divorce so he or she can remarry. Current case law discourages the use of bifurcation. Specifically, in *Claughton v. Claughton*, the Florida Supreme Court explained:

[W]e believe trial judges should avoid this split procedure. The general law and our procedural rules at both the trial and appellate levels are designed for one final judgment and one appeal. Splitting the process can cause multiple legal and procedural problems which result in delay and additional expense to the litigants. This split procedure should be used only when it is clearly necessary for the best interests of the parties or their children. The convenience of one of the parties for an early remarriage does not justify its use.⁶⁴

The bill:

- Provides that a court may not bifurcate the divorce until more than 180 days have elapsed from filing of the action, unless written findings are made regarding exceptional circumstances. This appears to be a codification of current law applicable to the entire case.
- Provides that if more than 180 days have elapsed since the filing of the petition, the court may bifurcate the action, but only if appropriate temporary orders are made.
- Provides that if more than 365 days have elapsed since the filing of the petition, the court must grant dissolution of the marriage with a reservation of all other substantive issues. In such case the court must enter temporary terms as are necessary.

Effect of Bill on Existing Alimony Awards

Current awards of alimony, including permanent alimony, are subject to modification upon a showing of changed circumstances as set forth in the statutes.⁶⁵ The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show changes that would require modification.⁶⁶ The bill:

- Provides that the amended statute applies to all initial awards of alimony made prior to July 1, 2013.
- Provides that the amended statute applies to all modifications of alimony made after July 1, 2013.

⁵⁹ Section 61.071, F.S.; Section 61.16, F.S.; Scanlon v. Scanlon, 154 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1963).

⁶⁰ Section 61.071, F.S.

⁶¹ *Id*.

⁶² See s. 61.08, F.S.

⁶³ Section 61.19, F.S.

⁶⁴ Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1981).

⁶⁵ Section 61.14, F.S.

⁶⁶ Koski v. Koski, 98 So.3d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

- Provides that the amendments to the statute may serve as a basis to modify awards entered into before July 1, 2013.
- Provides that an obligor may petition to modify an existing obligation after either July 1, 2013, July 1, 2014, or July 1, 2015 depending upon the number of years of the marriage.⁶⁷

B. SECTION DIRECTORY:

Section 1 amends s. 61.071, F.S., regarding alimony pendente lite.

Section 2 amends s. 61.08, F.S., relating to alimony.

Section 3 amends s. 61.09, F.S., deleting provisions providing for alimony unconnected with dissolution of a marriage.

Section 4 amends s. 61.14, F.S., regarding supportive relationships.

Section 5 amends s. 61.19, F.S., allowing separate adjudication of issues in a dissolution of marriage case in certain circumstances.

Section 6 provides the amendments made by this bill apply to all modifications after the effective date of the bill.

Section 7 provides an effective date of July 1, 2013.

II. FISCAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT

A. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENT:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state expenditures. See Fiscal Comments.

B. FISCAL IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government expenditures.

C. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR:

The bill does not appear to have any direct economic impact on the private sector.

D. FISCAL COMMENTS:

This bill may increase the court workloads in dissolution of marriage cases. The bill requires written findings for many court determinations, and enables review of existing alimony awards in light of the new standards and other amendments to ch. 61, F.S. This bill may also decrease court workloads because it creates alimony standards that are more certain than those under current law, which may

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⁶⁷ The requirements of the bill for modification of an existing award are less than 8 years, less than 15 years, and more than 15 years, respectively.

encourage settlement of cases that are currently litigated. There is no way to quantify the possible costs or savings resulting from passage of this bill.

III. COMMENTS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

1. Applicability of Municipality/County Mandates Provision:

The bill does not appear to require counties or municipalities to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds, reduce the authority that counties or municipalities have to raise revenue in the aggregate, nor reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties or municipalities.

2. Other:

One provision in the bill provides a means to adjust a statutory formula, but limits what evidence is admissible for purpose of the determination (see lines 302-312). Another provision limits the evidence to solely federal income tax returns (see lines 336-337). There is a balance between enactments of the Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court on matters relating to evidence. The Legislature has enacted and continues to revise ch. 90, F.S. (the Evidence Code), and the Florida Supreme Court tends to adopt these changes as rules. The Florida Supreme Court regularly adopts amendments to the Evidence Code as rules of court when it is determined that the matter is procedural rather than substantive. Although these matters are outside of the Evidence Code, they appear to create evidentiary rules. If the Florida Supreme Court views the changes in this bill as an infringement upon the Court's authority over practice and procedure, it may refuse to adopt the evidentiary changes in the bill.

One provision in the bill appears to limit a court in imposing a fine or sanction for contempt of court based on non-payment of alimony. (see lines 540-545). Art. II, s. 3, Fla. Const. provides, "The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." Case law provides that "[a]ny legislative enactment that purports to do away with the inherent power of contempt directly affects a separate and distinct function of the judicial branch, and, as such, violates the separation of powers doctrine contained in article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution." *Walker v. Bentley*, 678 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1996).

B. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY:

The bill does not appear to create a need for rulemaking or rulemaking authority.

C. DRAFTING ISSUES OR OTHER COMMENTS:

Line 3 contains the phrase "pendent lite". Based on the content, it perhaps should be changed to "pendente lite".

One provision of the bill has the effect of prohibiting alimony in an annulment action. Most think of annulment actions being filed very shortly after a marriage ceremony, in which case alimony would seem unlikely. However, an annulment action is also appropriate where bigamy is discovered, even if the parties have been together for quite some time. Current law allows for alimony in this situation, ⁶⁸ the bill prohibits it.

One provision of the bill prohibits imputation of income derived from Social Security retirement benefits. (see lines 338-340). The concept of imputed income is that it is income assumed, that is, imputed income is income that someone should be but is not actually receiving. In the case of Social Security

⁶⁸ Kindle v. Kindle, 629 So.2d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (20 year marriage annulled due to bigamy). **STORAGE NAME**: h0231.CJS.DOCX

benefits, it is unclear how or why such benefits would be owed and not actually received, and thus it is unclear how such benefits can be the subject of an imputed income determination.

IV. AMENDMENTS/ COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE CHANGES

n/a

STORAGE NAME: h0231.CJS.DOCX

A bill to be entitled 1 2 An act relating to dissolution of marriage; amending 3 s. 61.071, F.S.; providing that alimony pendent lite shall be calculated in accordance with s. 61.08, F.S.; 4 5 amending s. 61.08, F.S.; providing definitions; requiring a court to make certain written findings 6 7 concerning alimony; providing for automatic 8 termination of awards in certain circumstances; 9 revising factors to be considered in whether to award alimony or maintenance; revising provisions relating 10 11 to the protection of awards of alimony; revising 12 provisions for an award of durational alimony; 13 providing presumptions for or against awards based the duration of a marriage; providing for overcoming the 14 15 presumptions; repealing provisions relating to permanent alimony; requiring written findings 16 regarding the incomes and standard of living of the 17 parties after dissolution of marriage; providing for 18 19 an additional amount of alimony due to age or 20 disability of a party seeking alimony in certain 21 circumstances; providing for imputation of income to a 22 party in certain circumstances; providing for the 23 offset of or other consideration of an alimony obligation in determining equitable distribution or 24 25 child support in certain circumstances; amending s. 26 61.09, F.S.; deleting provisions providing for alimony 27 unconnected with dissolution of a marriage; amending 28 s. 61.14, F.S.; providing that an alimony order shall

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be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances by clear and convincing evidence; providing that an increase in an obligor's income may not be considered permanent in nature until it has been maintained for a specified period without interruption; providing a presumption relating to the retroactive effect of a modification or termination of an alimony award; providing for award of attorney fees and costs if it is determined that an oblique unnecessarily or unreasonably litigated a petition for modification or termination of an alimony award; revising provisions relating to the effect of a supportive relationship on an award of alimony; prohibiting a court from reserving jurisdiction to reinstate an alimony award; providing that income and assets of the obligor's spouse or the person with whom the obligor resides may not be considered in the redetermination in a modification action; providing that if the court orders alimony concurrent with a child support order, the alimony award may not be modified due to the later modification or termination of child support payments; providing that the attaining of retirement age is a substantial change in circumstances; providing factors the court shall consider in determining whether the obligor's retirement is reasonable; requiring a court to impute income to the obligee based on the analysis and factors set forth in specified provisions; amending s.

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61.19, F.S.; allowing separate adjudication of issues in a dissolution of marriage case in certain circumstances; providing applicability; providing an effective date.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. Section 61.071, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

61.071 Alimony pendente lite; suit money.—In every proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, a party may claim alimony and suit money in the petition or by motion, and if the petition is well founded, the court shall allow alimony calculated in accordance with s. 61.08 and a reasonable sum of suit money therefor. If a party in any proceeding for dissolution of marriage claims alimony or suit money in his or her answer or by motion, and the answer or motion is well founded, the court shall allow alimony calculated in accordance with s. 61.08 and a reasonable sum of suit money therefor.

Section 2. Section 61.08, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

61.08 Alimony.-

(1) As used this section, the term:

 (a) "Alimony" means a payment of support by an obligor to an obligee as ordered by a court in accordance with this section, in the form of bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, or durational alimony.

(b) "Long-term marriage" means a marriage having a

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duration of 20 years or longer, as measured from the date of the marriage to the date of filing the petition for dissolution.

- (c) "Mid-term marriage" means a marriage having a duration longer than 10 years but less than 20 years, as measured from the date of the marriage to the date of filing the petition for dissolution.
- (d) "Net income" means net income as determined in accordance with s. 61.30.

- (e) "Short-term marriage" means a marriage having a duration equal to or less than 10 years, as measured from the date of the marriage to the date of filing the petition for dissolution.
- (2)(a)(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony to either party, which alimony may be bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, or durational, or a permanent in nature or any combination of these forms of alimony where appropriate. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments, or payments in lump sum, or both. Alimony may not be awarded in any other action.
- (b) The court shall make written findings regarding the basis for awarding combinations of alimony, including the type of alimony and length of time for which it is awarded. The court may only award combinations of alimony to provide greater economic assistance to allow the recipient to achieve rehabilitation.
- (c) The court may consider the adultery of either party spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded, only to the extent that the

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adultery caused a significant depletion in the material assets or caused a significant reduction in the income of a party.

- (d) In all dissolution actions, the court shall include written findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award or denial of alimony.
- (e) An award of alimony granted under this section shall automatically terminate without further action from either party or the court upon the earlier of:
- 1. The expiration of the time period specified in the alimony order, or
- 2. The obligee's reaching retirement age for full social security retirement benefits. If the obligee proves by clear and convincing evidence that a need for alimony would continue to exist despite receipt of full social security benefits and that the obligor's ability to pay has not been diminished, the court shall award an extension of alimony consistent with this section.

of demonstrating a need for alimony in accordance with this section. In determining whether to award alimony or maintenance, the court shall first make, in writing, a specific factual determination as to whether the other either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance. If the court finds that the a party seeking alimony has met its burden of proof in demonstrating a need for alimony or maintenance and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance, then in determining the proper type and amount of alimony or

maintenance under subsections $(5)-\underline{(7)}$, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:

- (a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
 - (a) (b) The duration of the marriage.

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- (b) (c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
- (c) (d) The financial resources of each party, including the portion of nonmarital assets that were relied upon by the parties during the marriage and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
- (d) (e) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
- (e) (f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.
- $\underline{\text{(f)}}$ The responsibilities each party will have with regard to any minor children the parties they have in common.
- (g) (h) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of an any alimony award, which must be consistent with applicable state and federal tax laws including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable, nondeductible payment.
- (h)(i) All sources of income available to either party, including income available to either party through investments

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of any asset held by that party that were acquired during the marriage.

- (i) The net income and standard of living available to each party after the application of the alimony award. There is a rebuttable presumption that both parties will necessarily have a lower standard of living after the dissolution of marriage than the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage. This presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.
- (j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties, if that factor is specifically identified in the award with findings of fact justifying the application of the factor.
- (4)(3) To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a decreasing term life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose in an amount adequate to secure the alimony award. Any such security may only be awarded upon a showing of special circumstances. If the court finds special circumstances and awards such security, the court must make specific evidentiary findings regarding the availability, cost, and financial impact on the obligated party. Any security may be modifiable in the event the underlying alimony award is modified and shall be reduced in an amount commensurate with any reduction in the alimony award.
- (4) For purposes of determining alimony, there is a rebuttable presumption that a short-term marriage is a marriage

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having a duration of less than 7 years, a moderate-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of greater than 7 years but less than 17 years, and long-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of 17 years or greater. The length of a marriage is the period of time from the date of marriage until the date of filing of an action for dissolution of marriage.

- party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.
- (6)(a) Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded to assist a party in establishing the capacity for self-support through either:
 - 1. The redevelopment of previous skills or credentials; or
- 2. The acquisition of education, training, or work experience necessary to develop appropriate employment skills or credentials.
- (b) In order to award rehabilitative alimony, there must be a specific and defined rehabilitative plan which shall be included as a part of any order awarding rehabilitative alimony.
- (c) An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified or terminated in accordance with s. 61.14 based upon a substantial change in circumstances, upon noncompliance with the

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rehabilitative plan, or upon completion of the rehabilitative plan.

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- Durational alimony may be awarded when permanent periodic alimony is inappropriate. The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time after following a short-term, mid-term, or longterm marriage of short or moderate duration or following a marriage of long duration if there is no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis. When awarding durational alimony, the court must make written findings that an award of any other form of alimony or a combination thereof is not appropriate. An award of durational alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. The amount of an award of durational alimony shall may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship in accordance with s. 61.14. However, The length of an award of durational alimony may not be modified except under exceptional circumstances and may not exceed 50 percent of the length of the marriage, unless the party seeking alimony proves by clear and convincing evidence the need for an award of alimony for a greater period the length of the marriage.
- (8) (a) There is a presumption against awarding alimony for a short-term marriage. A party seeking alimony for such a marriage may overcome this presumption by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence a need for alimony. If the court finds that the party has met its burden in demonstrating a need for alimony, the court shall determine a monthly alimony obligation

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that may not exceed the lesser of 50 percent of the difference between the obligor's monthly net income and the obligee's monthly net income or 20 percent of the obligor's monthly net income.

- (b) There is no presumption in favor of either party in awarding alimony for a mid-term marriage. A party seeking alimony shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence a need for alimony. If the court finds that the party has met its burden in demonstrating a need for alimony, the court shall determine a monthly alimony obligation that may not exceed the lesser of 50 percent of the difference between the obligor's monthly net income and the obligee's monthly net income or the following:
- 1. For a marriage of more than 10 years but less than 11 years, 20 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 2. For a marriage of at least 11 years but less than 12 years, 22 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 3. For a marriage of at least 12 years but less than 13 years, 23 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 4. For a marriage of at least 13 years but less than 14 years, 24 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 5. For a marriage of at least 14 years but less than 15 years, 25 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 6. For a marriage of at least 15 years but less than 16 years, 26 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 7. For a marriage of at least 16 years but less than 17 years, 27 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
 - 8. For a marriage of at least 17 years but less than 18

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years, 28 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.

- 9. For a marriage of at least 18 years but less than 19 years, 29 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 10. For a marriage of at least 19 years but less than 20 years, 30 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- (c) There is a presumption in favor of awarding alimony for a long-term marriage. A party against whom alimony is sought for such a marriage may overcome this presumption by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that there is no need for alimony. If the court finds that the party against whom alimony is sought fails to meet its burden in demonstrating no need for alimony, the court shall determine a monthly alimony obligation that shall not exceed the lesser of 50 percent of the difference between the obligor's monthly net income and the obligee's monthly net income or the following:
- 1. For a marriage of at least 20 years but less than 21 years, 31 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 2. For a marriage of at least 21 years but less than 22 years, 32 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- 3. For a marriage of at least 22 years, 33 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor.
- (9) Notwithstanding subsection (8), the court may increase the percentage of monthly net income for purposes of determining alimony by up to an additional 10 percentage points, to a maximum of 43 percent of the monthly net income of the obligor, if the party seeking alimony proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is disabled or 65 years of age or older. For purposes of this subsection:

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(a) Disability may be proved only by a social security total disability benefit entitlement letter.

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(b) Age may be proved only by an original birth certificate or a Florida driver license Permanent alimony may be awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage. Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of long duration if such an award is appropriate upon consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (2), following a marriage of moderate duration if such an award is appropriate based upon clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (2), or following a marriage of short duration if there are written findings of exceptional circumstances. In awarding permanent alimony, the court shall include a finding that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the parties. An award of permanent alimony terminates upon the death of either party, or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship in accordance with s. 61.14.

(10) (9) Notwithstanding any other law, alimony may not be awarded to a party who has a monthly net income that is equal to or greater than the other party. Except in the case of a longterm marriage, the court, in awarding alimony, shall impute income to the obligor and obligee as follows, based solely on

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337 federal tax returns:

- (a) Obligor.—Social security retirement benefits shall not be imputed to an obligor, as demonstrated by a social security retirement benefits entitlement letter.
 - (b) Obligee.-
- 1. If an obligee is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for less than 1 year before the time of the filing of the petition, an obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 90 percent of the obligee's previous monthly net income.
- 2. If an obligee is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 1 year but less than 2 years before the time of the filing of the petition, an obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 80 percent of the obligee's previous monthly net income.
- 3. If an obligee is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 2 years but less than 3 years before the time of the filing of the petition, an obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 70 percent of the obligee's previous monthly net income.
- 4. If an obligee is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 3 years but less than 4 years before the time of the filing of the petition, an obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 60 percent of the obligee's previous monthly net income.
- 5. If an obligee is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 4 years but less than 5 years before the time of the filing of the petition, an

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obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 50 percent of the obligee's previous monthly net income.

- 6. If an obligee is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for 5 years or greater before the time of the filing of the petition, an obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 40 percent of the obligee's previous monthly net income, or the monthly net income of a minimum wage earner at the time of the filing of the petition, whichever is greater.
- 7. The court shall reduce the imputation of income specified in this paragraph if the obligee proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she does not have the ability to earn the imputed income through reasonable means The award of alimony may not leave the payor with significantly less not income than the net income of the recipient unless there are written findings of exceptional circumstances.
- (11)-(10)-(a) With respect to any order requiring the payment of alimony entered on or after January 1, 1985, unless the provisions of paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) applies apply, the court shall direct in the order that the payments of alimony be made through the appropriate depository as provided in s. 61.181.
- (b) With respect to any order requiring the payment of alimony entered before January 1, 1985, upon the subsequent appearance, on or after that date, of one or both parties before the court having jurisdiction for the purpose of modifying or enforcing the order or in any other proceeding related to the order, or upon the application of either party, unless the

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provisions of paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) applies apply, the court shall modify the terms of the order as necessary to direct that payments of alimony be made through the appropriate depository as provided in s. 61.181.

- (c) If there is no minor child, alimony payments need not be directed through the depository.
- (d)1. If there is a minor child of the parties and both parties so request, the court may order that alimony payments need not be directed through the depository. In this case, the order of support shall provide, or be deemed to provide, that either party may subsequently apply to the depository to require that payments be made through the depository. The court shall provide a copy of the order to the depository.
- 2. If the provisions of subparagraph 1. applies apply, either party may subsequently file with the depository an affidavit alleging default or arrearages in payment and stating that the party wishes to initiate participation in the depository program. The party shall provide copies of the affidavit to the court and the other party or parties. Fifteen days after receipt of the affidavit, the depository shall notify all parties that future payments shall be directed to the depository.
- 3. In IV-D cases, the IV-D agency shall have the same rights as the obligee in requesting that payments be made through the depository.
- (12) Notwithstanding any other law, to the extent that the determination of equitable distribution or child support may affect an obligee's need for alimony or an obligor's ability to

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pay alimony, the court may offset or otherwise consider an alimony obligation in determining equitable distribution or child support under this chapter.

Section 3. Section 61.09, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

61.09 Alimony and Child support unconnected with dissolution.—If a person having the ability to contribute to the maintenance of his or her spouse and support of his or her minor child fails to do so, the spouse who is not receiving support may apply to the court for alimony and for support for the child without seeking dissolution of marriage, and the court shall enter an order as it deems just and proper.

Section 4. Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) and paragraph (a) of subsection (5) of section 61.14, Florida Statutes, are amended, paragraphs (c) and (d) are added to subsection (11) of that section, and subsection (12) is added to that section, to read:

61.14 Enforcement and modification of support, maintenance, or alimony agreements or orders.—

(1)

(b) 1. An alimony order shall be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence shall include, but is not limited to, federal income tax returns. An increase in an obligor's income may not be considered permanent in nature unless the increase has been maintained without interruption for at least 2 years, taking into account the obligor's ability to sustain his or her income.

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2.1. Notwithstanding subparagraph 1., the court must may reduce or terminate an award of alimony upon specific written findings by the court that since the granting of a divorce and the award of alimony a supportive relationship has existed between the obligee and another a person with whom the obligee resides, except upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence by the obligee that his or her long-term need for alimony, taking into account the totality of the circumstance, has not been reduced by the supportive relationship. On the issue of whether alimony should be reduced or terminated under this paragraph, the burden is on the obligor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a supportive relationship exists.

- 3.2. In determining whether an existing award of alimony should be reduced or terminated because of an alleged supportive relationship between an obligee and a person who is not related by consanguinity or affinity and with whom the obligee resides, the court shall elicit the nature and extent of the relationship in question. The court shall give consideration, without limitation, to circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following, in determining the relationship of an obligee to another person:
- a. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have held themselves out as a married couple by engaging in conduct such as using the same last name, using a common mailing address, referring to each other in terms such as "my husband" or "my wife," or otherwise conducting themselves in a manner that evidences a permanent supportive relationship.

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b. The period of time that the obligee has resided with the other person in a permanent place of abode.

- c. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have pooled their assets or income or otherwise exhibited financial interdependence.
- d. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has supported the other, in whole or in part.
- e. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has performed valuable services for the other.
- f. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has performed valuable services for the other's company or employer.
- g. Whether the obligee and the other person have worked together to create or enhance anything of value.
- h. Whether the obligee and the other person have jointly contributed to the purchase of any real or personal property.
- i. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other person have an express agreement regarding property sharing or support.
- j. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other person have an implied agreement regarding property sharing or support.
- k. Whether the obligee and the other person have provided support to the children of one another, regardless of any legal duty to do so.
- $\underline{4.3.}$ This paragraph does not abrogate the requirement that every marriage in this state be solemnized under a license, does not recognize a common law marriage as valid, and does not recognize a de facto marriage. This paragraph recognizes only

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that relationships do exist that provide economic support equivalent to a marriage and that alimony terminable on remarriage may be reduced or terminated upon the establishment of equivalent equitable circumstances as described in this paragraph. The existence of a conjugal relationship, though it may be relevant to the nature and extent of the relationship, is not necessary for the application of the provisions of this paragraph.

- 5. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any modification or termination of an alimony award is retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition. In an action under this section, if it is determined that the obligee unnecessarily or unreasonably litigated the underlying petition for modification or termination, the court may award the obligor his or her reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to s. 61.16 and applicable case law.
- 6. A court terminating an alimony award based on the existence of a supportive relationship may not reserve jurisdiction to later reinstate alimony.
- (5)(a) When a court of competent jurisdiction enters an order for the payment of alimony or child support or both, the court shall make a finding of the obligor's imputed or actual present ability to comply with the order. If the obligor subsequently fails to pay alimony or support and a contempt hearing is held, the original order of the court creates a presumption that the obligor has the present ability to pay the alimony or support and to purge himself or herself from the contempt. At the contempt hearing, the obligor shall have the

burden of proof to show that he or she lacks the ability to purge himself or herself from the contempt. This presumption is adopted as a presumption under s. 90.302(2) to implement the public policy of this state that children shall be maintained from the resources of their parents and as provided for in s. 409.2551, and that spouses be maintained as provided for in s. 61.08. The court shall state in its order the reasons for granting or denying the contempt. A monetary award granted by the court pursuant to a contempt hearing pursuant to this paragraph may not exceed the monthly alimony obligation of the obligor for the number of months in which the obligor is delinquent. A court may award attorney fees to a prevailing party in an action to enforce an alimony order.

(11)

- (c) If the obligor remarries or resides with another person, the income and assets of the obligor's spouse or the person with whom the obligor resides may not be considered in a modification action regarding such obligor, except for purposes of discovery to determine the obligor's income or assets within the pooled income and assets.
- (d) If the court orders alimony payable concurrent with a child support order, the alimony award may not be modified solely because of a later reduction or termination of child support payments.
- (12)(a) The fact that an obligor has reached a reasonable retirement age for his or her profession, has retired, and has no intent to return to work, or has reached the retirement age for full social security benefits, shall be considered a

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substantial change in circumstances as a matter of law. An obligor who has reached the retirement age for full social security benefits is considered to have reached a reasonable retirement age. With regard to an obligor that has retired before the retirement age for full social security benefits, the court shall consider the following in determining whether the obligor's retirement age is reasonable:

1. Age.

- 2. Health.
- 3. Type of work.
- 4. Normal retirement age for that type of work.
- (b) In anticipation of retirement, the obligor may file a petition for termination or modification of the alimony award effective upon the earlier of the retirement date or the date the obligor reaches the retirement age for full social security benefits. The court shall either terminate the award or reduce the award based on the circumstances of the parties after retirement and based on the factors in s. 61.08(3), unless the obligee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the need for alimony at the present level continues to exist and that the obligor's ability to pay has not been diminished.
- Section 5. Section 61.19, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
- 61.19 Entry of judgment of dissolution of marriage; delay period; separate adjudication of issues.—
- $\underline{\text{(1)}}$ A No final judgment of dissolution of marriage may $\underline{\text{not}}$ be entered until at least 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing the original petition for dissolution of marriage, + but

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the court, on a showing that injustice would result from this delay, may enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage at an earlier date.

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(2) (a) During the first 180 days after the date of service of the original petition for dissolution of marriage, the court may not grant a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues unless the court makes written findings that there are exceptional circumstances that make the use of this process clearly necessary to protect the parties or their children and that granting a final dissolution will not cause irreparable harm to either party or the children. Before granting a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues, the court shall enter appropriate temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children, which orders shall remain effective until all other issues can be adjudicated by the court. The desire of one of the parties to remarry does not justify the use of this process.

(b) If more than 180 days have elapsed after the date of service of the original petition for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues only if the court enters appropriate temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children, which orders shall remain effective until such time as all other issues can be adjudicated by the court, and makes a written finding that no irreparable harm will result from

granting a final dissolution.

- (c) If more than 365 days have elapsed after the date of service of the original petition for dissolution of marriage, absent a showing by either party that irreparable harm will result from granting a final dissolution, the court shall, upon request of either party, immediately grant a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues. Before granting a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues, the court shall enter appropriate temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children, which orders shall remain effective until all other issues can be adjudicated by the court.
- (d) The temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children entered before granting a dissolution of marriage without an adjudication of all substantive issues may include, but are not limited to, temporary orders that:
 - 1. Restrict the sale or disposition of property.
 - 2. Protect and preserve the marital assets.
 - 3. Establish temporary support.
 - 4. Provide for maintenance of health insurance.
 - 5. Provide for maintenance of life insurance.
- (e) The court is not required to enter temporary orders to protect the parties and their children if the court enters a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that adjudicates substantially all of the substantive issues between the parties but reserves jurisdiction to address ancillary issues such as

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the entry of a qualified domestic relations order or the adjudication of attorney fees and costs.

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Section 6. (1) The amendments made by this act to chapter 61, Florida Statutes, apply to all initial awards of alimony entered on or after July 1, 2013, and to all modifications of alimony of such awards made after July 1, 2013. Such amendments may serve as a basis to modify awards entered before July 1, 2013, or as a basis to change amounts or duration of awards existing before July 1, 2013.

- (2) An obligor whose initial award or modification of such award was made before July 1, 2013, may file a modification action according to the following schedule:
- (a) An obligor who was married to the alimony recipient 8 years or less may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2013.
- (b) An obligor who was married to the alimony recipient 15 years or less, but more than 8 years, may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2014.
- (c) An obligor who was married to the alimony recipient more than 15 years may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2015.
- Section 7. This act shall take effect July 1, 2013.

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CODING: Words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions.



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

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COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE	E ACTION
ADOPTED	_ (Y/N)
ADOPTED AS AMENDED	_ (Y/N)
ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION	_ (Y/N)
FAILED TO ADOPT	_ (Y/N)
WITHDRAWN	_ (Y/N)
OTHER	

Committee/Subcommittee hearing bill: Civil Justice Subcommittee Representative Workman offered the following:

Amendment (with title amendment)

Remove everything after the enacting clause and insert: Section 1. Section 61.071, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

61.071 Alimony pendente lite; suit money.—In every proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, a party may claim alimony and suit money in the petition or by motion, and if the petition is well founded, the court shall allow alimony calculated in accordance with s. 61.08 and a reasonable sum of suit money therefor. If a party in any proceeding for dissolution of marriage claims alimony or suit money in his or her answer or by motion— and the answer or motion is well founded, the court shall allow alimony calculated in accordance with s. 61.08 and a reasonable sum of suit money therefor.

Section 2. Section 61.08, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

61.08 Alimony.-

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


COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

- (1) For purposes of this section, the term:
- (a) "Alimony" means a court-ordered payment of support by an obligor to an obligee after the dissolution of a marriage.
- (b) "Long-term marriage" means a marriage having a duration of 20 years or more, as measured from the date of the marriage to the date of filing the petition for dissolution.
- (c) "Mid-term marriage" means a marriage having a duration of more than 10 years but less than 20 years, as measured from the date of the marriage to the date of filing the petition for dissolution.
- (d) "Net income" means net income as determined in accordance with s. 61.30.
- (e) "Short-term marriage" means a marriage having a duration equal to or less than 10 years, as measured from the date of the marriage to the date of filing the petition for dissolution.
- (2)(a)(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony to either party in the form of, which alimony may be bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, or durational alimony, or a permanent in nature or any combination of these forms of alimony, but shall prioritize an award of bridge-the-gap alimony, followed by rehabilitative alimony, over any other form of alimony. In an any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments, or payments in lump sum, or both. Alimony may not be awarded in any other action.
- (b) The court shall make written findings regarding the basis for awarding a combination of forms of alimony, including the type of alimony and length of time for which it is awarded.





Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment	No.	1										
The court	may	award	only	a	combinati	ion	of	forms	of	ali	mony	to
provide g	reate	r ecor	nomic	as	ssistance	in	ord	ler to	all	.OW	the	
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- (c) The court may consider the adultery of either party spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded.
- (d) In all dissolution actions, the court shall include written findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (3) (2) supporting an award or denial of alimony.
- (e) An award of alimony granted under this section automatically terminates without further action of either party or the court upon the earlier of:
 - 1. The durational limits specified in this section; or
- 2. The obligee's normal retirement age for social security retirement benefits.

If the obligee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the need for alimony continues to exist and the court determines that the obligor continues to have the ability to pay, the court shall issue written findings justifying an extension of alimony consistent with the provisions of this section.

- (f) The clerk of the court shall, upon request, indicate in writing that an alimony obligation has terminated in accordance with paragraph (e), unless there is a pending motion before the court disputing the fulfillment of the alimony obligation.
- (3) (2) The party seeking alimony has the burden of proof of demonstrating a need for alimony in accordance with



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 subsection (8) and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony. In determining whether to award alimony or maintenance, the court shall first make, in writing, a specific factual determination as to whether the other either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance. If the court finds that the a party seeking alimony has met its burden of proof in demonstrating a need for alimony or maintenance and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance, then in determining the proper type and amount of alimony or maintenance under subsections (5)-(9)(5)(8), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:

- (a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
 - (a) (b) The duration of the marriage.
- (b)(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
- (c) (d) The financial resources of each party, including the portion of nonmarital assets that were relied upon by the parties during the marriage and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
- <u>(d)</u> (e) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.




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Amendment No. 1

- (e)(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.
- $\underline{\text{(f)}}$ The responsibilities each party will have with regard to any minor children that the parties they have in common.
- (g) (h) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of an any alimony award, which must be consistent with applicable state and federal tax laws and may include including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable, nondeductible payment.
- (h)(i) All sources of income available to either party, including income available to either party through investments of any asset held by that party which was acquired during the marriage or acquired outside the marriage and relied upon during the marriage.
- (i) The net income and standard of living available to each party after the application of the alimony award. There is a rebuttable presumption that both parties will have a lower standard of living after the dissolution of marriage than the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage. This presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.
- (j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties, if that factor is specifically identified in the award with findings of fact justifying the application of the factor.
- (4) To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay



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Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 alimony to purchase or maintain a <u>decreasing term</u> life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets that which may be suitable for that purpose, in an amount adequate to secure the alimony award. Any such security may be awarded only upon a showing of special circumstances. If the court finds special circumstances and awards such security, the court must make specific evidentiary findings regarding the availability, cost, and financial impact on the obligated party. Any security may be modifiable in the event that the underlying alimony award is modified and shall be reduced in an amount commensurate with any reduction in the alimony award.

- (4) For purposes of determining alimony, there is a rebuttable presumption that a short term marriage is a marriage having a duration of less than 7 years, a moderate term marriage is a marriage having a duration of greater than 7 years but less than 17 years, and long term marriage is a marriage having a duration of 17 years or greater. The length of a marriage is the period of time from the date of marriage until the date of filing of an action for dissolution of marriage.
- (5) Bridge-the-gap alimony may be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage



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Amendment No. 1 of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony is shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.

- (6)(a) Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded to assist a party in establishing the capacity for self-support through either:
 - 1. The redevelopment of previous skills or credentials; or
- 2. The acquisition of education, training, or work experience necessary to develop appropriate employment skills or credentials.
- (b) In order to award rehabilitative alimony, there must be a specific and defined rehabilitative plan which shall be included as a part of any order awarding rehabilitative alimony.
- (c) An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified or terminated only during the rehabilitative period in accordance with s. 61.14 based upon a substantial change in circumstances, upon noncompliance with the rehabilitative plan, or upon completion of the rehabilitative plan.
- periodic alimony is inappropriate. The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a short-term, mid-term, or long-term marriage of short or moderate duration or following a marriage of long duration if there is no engoing need for support on a permanent basis. When awarding durational alimony, the court must make written findings that an award of another form of alimony or a combination of the other forms of alimony is not appropriate. An award of durational alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party



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Amendment No. 1 receiving alimony. The amount of an award of durational alimony shall may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship in accordance with s. 61.14. However, The length of an award of durational alimony may not be modified except under exceptional circumstances and may not exceed 50 percent of the length of the marriage, unless the party seeking alimony proves by clear and convincing evidence that exceptional circumstances justify the need for a longer award of alimony, which exceptional circumstances must be set out in writing by the court the length of the marriage.

- (8) (a) There is a rebuttable presumption against awarding alimony for a short-term marriage. A party seeking alimony may overcome this presumption by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence a need for alimony. If the court finds that the party has met its burden in demonstrating a need for alimony and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony, the court shall determine a monthly award of alimony that may not exceed 20 percent of the obligor's monthly net income.
- (b) There is no presumption in favor of either party to an award of alimony for a mid-term marriage. A party seeking such alimony must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a need for alimony. If the court finds that the party has met its burden in demonstrating a need for alimony and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony, the court shall determine a monthly alimony obligation that may not exceed 30 percent of the obligor's monthly net income.




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(9) The court may order alimony exceeding the monthly net
income limits established in subsection (8) if the court
determines, in accordance with the factors in subsection (3),
that there is a need for additional alimony, which determination
must be set out in writing. Permanent alimony may be awarded to
provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were
established during the marriage of the parties for a party who
lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and
necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage.
Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of long
duration if such an award is appropriate upon consideration of
the factors set forth in subsection (2), following a marriage of
moderate duration if such an award is appropriate based upon
clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors
set forth in subsection (2), or following a marriage of short
duration if there are written findings of exceptional
circumstances. In awarding permanent alimony, the court shall
include a finding that no other form of alimony is fair and
reasonable under the circumstances of the parties. An award of





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Amendment No. 1
permanent alimony terminates upon the death of either party or
upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award may
be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in
circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship
in accordance with s. 61.14.

- (10) A party against whom alimony is sought who has met the requirements for retirement in accordance with s. 61.14(12) before the filing of the petition for dissolution is not required to pay alimony unless the party seeking alimony proves by clear and convincing evidence the other party has the ability to pay alimony, in addition to all other requirements of this section.
- (11) (9) Notwithstanding any other law, alimony may not be awarded to a party who has a monthly net income that is equal to or more than the other party. Except in the case of a long-term marriage, in awarding alimony, the court shall impute income to the obligor and obligee as follows:
- (a) In the case of the obligor, social security retirement benefits may not be imputed to the obligor, as demonstrated by a social security retirement benefits entitlement letter.
 - (b) In the case of the obligee, if the obligee:
- 1. Is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for less than 1 year before the time of the filing of the petition, the obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 90 percent of the obligee's prior monthly net income.
- 2. Is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 1 year but less than 2 years before





COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

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Amendment No. 1
the time of the filing of the petition, the obligee's monthly
net income shall be imputed at 80 percent of the obligee's prior
monthly net income.

- 3. Is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 2 years but less than 3 years before the time of the filing of the petition, the obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 70 percent of the obligee's prior monthly net income.
- 4. Is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 3 years but less than 4 years before the time of the filing of the petition, the obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 60 percent of the obligee's prior monthly net income.
- 5. Is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 4 years but less than 5 years before the time of the filing of the petition, the obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 50 percent of the obligee's prior monthly net income.
- 6. Is unemployed at the time the petition is filed and has been unemployed for at least 5 years before the time of the filing of the petition, the obligee's monthly net income shall be imputed at 40 percent of the obligee's prior monthly net income, or the monthly net income of a minimum wage earner at the time of the filing of the petition, whichever is greater.
- 7. Proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she does not have the ability to earn the imputed income through reasonable means, the court shall reduce the imputation of income specified in this paragraph. If the obligee alleges that







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a physical disability has impaired his or her ability to earn
the imputed income, such disability must meet the definition of
disability as determined by the Social Security Administration.
The award of alimony may not leave the payor with significantly
less net income than the net income of the recipient unless
there are written findings of exceptional circumstances.

- (12)(a)(10)(a) With respect to any order requiring the payment of alimony entered on or after January 1, 1985, unless the provisions of paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) applies apply, the court shall direct in the order that the payments of alimony be made through the appropriate depository as provided in s. 61.181.
- (b) With respect to any order requiring the payment of alimony entered before January 1, 1985, upon the subsequent appearance, on or after that date, of one or both parties before the court having jurisdiction for the purpose of modifying or enforcing the order or in any other proceeding related to the order, or upon the application of either party, unless the provisions of paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) applies apply, the court shall modify the terms of the order as necessary to direct that payments of alimony be made through the appropriate depository as provided in s. 61.181.
- (c) If there is no minor child, alimony payments need not be directed through the depository.
- (d)1. If there is a minor child of the parties and both parties so request, the court may order that alimony payments need not be directed through the depository. In this case, the order of support must shall provide, or be deemed to provide,



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Amendment No. 1 that either party may subsequently apply to the depository to require that payments be made through the depository. The court shall provide a copy of the order to the depository.

- 2. If the provisions of subparagraph 1. applies apply, either party may subsequently file with the depository an affidavit alleging default or arrearages in payment and stating that the party wishes to initiate participation in the depository program. The party shall provide copies of the affidavit to the court and the other party or parties. Fifteen days after receipt of the affidavit, the depository shall notify all parties that future payments shall be directed to the depository.
- 3. In IV-D cases, the IV-D agency <u>has</u> shall have the same rights as the obligee in requesting that payments be made through the depository.

Section 3. Section 61.09, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

61.09 Alimony and child support unconnected with dissolution.—If a person having the ability to contribute to the maintenance of his or her spouse and support of his or her minor child fails to do so, the spouse who is not receiving support may apply to the court for alimony and for support for the child without seeking dissolution of marriage, and the court shall enter an order as it deems just and proper. Alimony awarded under this section shall be calculated in accordance with s. 61.08.

Section 4. Subsection (1) of section 61.14, Florida
Statutes, is amended, paragraph (c) is added to subsection (11)



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Amendment No. 1 of that section, and subsection (12) is added to that section, to read:

- 61.14 Enforcement and modification of support, maintenance, or alimony agreements or orders.—
- (1)(a) When the parties enter into an agreement for payments for, or instead of, support, maintenance, or alimony, whether in connection with a proceeding for dissolution or separate maintenance or with any voluntary property settlement, or when a party is required by court order to make any payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of either party changes or the child who is a beneficiary of an agreement or court order as described herein reaches majority after the execution of the agreement or the rendition of the order, either party may apply to the circuit court of the circuit in which the parties, or either of them, resided at the date of the execution of the agreement or reside at the date of the application, or in which the agreement was executed or in which the order was rendered, for an order terminating, decreasing, or increasing the amount of support, maintenance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties or the child, decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of separate support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the agreement or order. A finding that medical insurance is reasonably available or the child support guidelines schedule in s. 61.30 may constitute changed circumstances. Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.30(11)(c), the court may modify an order of support, maintenance, or alimony by terminating,



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Amendment No. 1 increasing, or decreasing the support, maintenance, or alimony retroactively to the date of the filing of the action or supplemental action for modification as equity requires, giving due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties or the child.

- (b) 1. If the court has determined that an existing alimony award as determined by the court at the time of dissolution is insufficient to meet the needs of the obligee, and that such need continues to exist, an alimony order shall be modified upward upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence of a permanently increased ability to pay alimony. Clear and convincing evidence must include, but need not limited to, federal tax returns. An increase in an obligor's income may not be considered permanent in nature unless the increase has been maintained without interruption for at least 2 years, taking into account the obligor's ability to sustain his or her income.
- 2.1. Notwithstanding subparagraph 1., the court shall may reduce or terminate an award of alimony upon specific written findings by the court that since the granting of a divorce and the award of alimony, a supportive relationship has existed between the obligee and another a person, except upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence by the obligee that his or her long-term need for alimony, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, has not been reduced by the supportive relationship with whom the obligee resides. On the issue of whether alimony should be reduced or terminated under this paragraph, the burden is on the obligor to prove by a



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Amendment No. 1 preponderance of the evidence that a supportive relationship exists.

- 3.2. In determining whether an existing award of alimony should be reduced or terminated because of an alleged supportive relationship between an obligee and a person who is not related by consanguinity or affinity and with whom the obligee resides, the court shall elicit the nature and extent of the relationship in question. The court shall give consideration, without limitation, to circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following, in determining the relationship of an obligee to another person:
- a. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have held themselves out as a married couple by engaging in conduct such as using the same last name, using a common mailing address, referring to each other in terms such as "my husband" or "my wife," or otherwise conducting themselves in a manner that evidences a permanent supportive relationship.
- b. The period of time that the obligee has resided with the other person in a permanent place of abode.
- c. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have pooled their assets or income or otherwise exhibited financial interdependence.
- d. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has supported the other, in whole or in part.
- e. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has performed valuable services for the other.
- f. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has performed valuable services for the other's company or employer.




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- g. Whether the obligee and the other person have worked together to create or enhance anything of value.
- h. Whether the obligee and the other person have jointly contributed to the purchase of any real or personal property.
- i. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other person have an express agreement regarding property sharing or support.
- j. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other person have an implied agreement regarding property sharing or support.
- k. Whether the obligee and the other person have provided support to the children of one another, regardless of any legal duty to do so.
- 4.3. This paragraph does not abrogate the requirement that every marriage in this state be solemnized under a license, does not recognize a common law marriage as valid, and does not recognize a de facto marriage. This paragraph recognizes only that relationships do exist that provide economic support equivalent to a marriage and that alimony terminable on remarriage may be reduced or terminated upon the establishment of equivalent equitable circumstances as described in this paragraph. The existence of a conjugal relationship, though it may be relevant to the nature and extent of the relationship, is not necessary for the application of the provisions of this paragraph.
- 5. There is a rebuttable presumption that any modification or termination of an alimony award is retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition. In an action under this section, if






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Amendment No. 1 it is determined that the obligee unnecessarily or unreasonably
litigated the underlying petition for modification or
termination, the court may award the obligor his or her
reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to s. 61.16 and
applicable case law.

- (c) For each support order reviewed by the department as required by s. 409.2564(11), if the amount of the child support award under the order differs by at least 10 percent but not less than \$25 from the amount that would be awarded under s. 61.30, the department shall seek to have the order modified and any modification shall be made without a requirement for proof or showing of a change in circumstances.
- (d) The department <u>may</u> shall have authority to adopt rules to <u>administer</u> implement this section.

(11)

- (c) If the court orders alimony payable concurrent with a child support order, the alimony award may not be modified solely because of a later reduction or termination of child support payments, unless the court finds the obligor has the ability to pay the modified alimony award, the existing alimony award as determined by the court at the time of dissolution is insufficient to meet the needs of the obligee, and such need continues to exist.
- (12) (a) The fact that an obligor has reached a reasonable retirement age for his or her profession, has retired, and has no intent to return to work, or has reached the normal retirement age for social security benefits, is considered a substantial change in circumstances as a matter of law. An





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obligor who has reached the normal retirement age for social
security benefits shall be considered to have reached a
reasonable retirement age. With regard to an obligor who has
retired before the normal retirement age for social security
benefits, the court shall consider the following in determining
whether the obligor's retirement age is reasonable.

1. Age.

- 2. Health.
- 3. Type of work.
- 4. Normal retirement age for that type of work.
- (b) In anticipation of retirement, the obligor may file a petition for termination or modification of the alimony award effective upon the earlier of the retirement date or the date the obligor reaches the normal retirement age for social security benefits. The court shall terminate the award or reduce the award based on the circumstances of the parties after retirement and based on the factors in s. 61.08, unless the obligee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the need for alimony at the present level continues to exist and that the obligor's ability to pay has not been diminished.
- Section 5. Section 61.19, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
- 61.19 Entry of judgment of dissolution of marriage; delay period; separate adjudication of issues.
- $\underline{\hspace{0.1cm}}$ (1) A No final judgment of dissolution of marriage may not be entered until at least 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing the original petition for dissolution of marriage, + but the court, on a showing that injustice would result from this



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 delay, may enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage at an earlier date.

- (2) (a) During the first 180 days after the date of service of the original petition for dissolution of marriage, the court may not grant a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues unless the court makes written findings that there are exceptional circumstances that make the use of this process clearly necessary to protect the parties or their children and that granting a final dissolution will not cause irreparable harm to either party or the children. Before granting a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues, the court shall enter temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children, which orders remain effective until all other issues can be adjudicated by the court. The desire of one party to remarry does not justify the use of this process.
- (b) If more than 180 days have elapsed after the date of service of the original petition for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues only if the court enters temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children, which orders remain effective until such time as all other issues can be adjudicated by the court, and makes a written finding that no irreparable harm will result from granting a final dissolution.
- (c) If more than 365 days have elapsed after the date of service of the original petition for dissolution of marriage,



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 absent a showing by either party that irreparable harm will result from granting a final dissolution, the court shall, upon request of either party, immediately grant a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues. Before granting a final dissolution of marriage with a reservation of jurisdiction to subsequently determine all other substantive issues, the court shall enter temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children, which orders remain effective until all other issues can be adjudicated by the court.

- (d) The temporary orders necessary to protect the parties and their children entered before granting a dissolution of marriage without an adjudication of all substantive issues may include, but are not limited to, temporary orders that:
 - 1. Restrict the sale or disposition of property.
 - 2. Protect and preserve the marital assets.
 - 3. Establish temporary support.
 - 4. Provide for maintenance of health insurance.
 - 5. Provide for maintenance of life insurance.
- (e) The court is not required to enter temporary orders to protect the parties and their children if the court enters a final judgment of dissolution of marriage which adjudicates substantially all of the substantive issues between the parties but reserves jurisdiction to address ancillary issues such as the entry of a qualified domestic relations order or the adjudication of attorney fees and costs.
- Section 6. (1) The amendments to chapter 61, Florida

 Statutes, made by this act apply to all initial awards of, and



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1
agreements for, alimony entered before July 1, 2013, and to all
modifications of such awards or agreements made before July 1,
2013, with the exception of agreements that are expressly
nonmodifiable. Such amendments may serve as a basis to modify
the amount or duration of an award existing before July 1, 2013.
Such amendments may also serve as a basis to modify an agreement
for alimony if the agreement is 25 percent or more in duration
or amount than an alimony award calculated under the amendments
made by this act.

- (2) An obligor whose initial award or modification of such award was made before July 1, 2013, may file a modification action according to the following schedule:
- (a) An obligor who is subject to an alimony award of 15 years or more may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2013.
- (b) An obligor who is subject to an alimony award of 8 years of more, but less than 15 years, may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2014.
- (c) An obligor who is subject to an alimony award of less than 8 years may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2015.
- (3) An obligor whose initial agreement or modification of such agreement was made before July 1, 2013, may file a modification action according to the following schedule:
- (a) An obligor who has agreed to permanent alimony may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2013.



Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

	(b)	An	<u>obliç</u>	gor w	ho	has	agreed	to	durati	lona	1 <u> </u>	alimony	of of	10
years	or	more	may	file	a	modi	ificatio	on a	action	on	or	after	July	1,
2014.														

- (c) An obligor who has agreed to durational alimony of more than 5 years but less than 10 years may file a modification action on or after July 1, 2015.
 - Section 7. This act shall take effect July 1, 2013.

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TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove everything before the enacting clause and insert: An act relating to dissolution of marriage; amending s. 61.071, F.S.; requiring that alimony pendente lite be calculated in accordance with s. 61.08, F.S.; amending s. 61.08, F.S.; defining terms; revising factors to be considered for alimony awards; requiring a court to make written findings regarding the basis for awarding a combination of forms of alimony, including the type of alimony and length of time for which it is awarded; revising factors to be considered when deciding whether to award alimony; providing that an award of alimony granted automatically terminates without further action under certain circumstances; providing that the party seeking alimony has the burden of proof of demonstrating a need for alimony and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony; requiring the court to consider specified

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Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

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relevant factors when determining the proper type and amount of alimony; revising provisions relating to the protection of awards of alimony; revising provisions for an award of durational alimony; specifying criteria related to the rebuttable presumption to award or not to award alimony; deleting a provision authorizing permanent alimony; requiring written findings regarding the incomes and standard of living of the parties after dissolution of marriage; amending s. 61.09, F.S.; providing for the calculation of alimony; amending s. 61.14, F.S.; authorizing a party to apply for an order to terminate the amount of support, maintenance, or alimony; requiring that an alimony order be modified upward upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence of an increased ability to pay alimony by the other party; prohibiting an increase in an obligor's income from being considered permanent in nature until it has been maintained for a specified period without interruption; providing an exemption from the reduction or termination of an alimony award in certain circumstances; providing that there is a rebuttable presumption that any modification or termination of an alimony award is retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition; providing for an award of attorney fees and costs if it is determined that an obligee unnecessarily or unreasonably litigates a petition for modification or termination of an alimony award; revising provisions



Bill No. HB 231 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

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relating to the effect of a supportive relationship on an award of alimony; providing that income and assets of the obligor's spouse or the person with whom the obligor resides may not be considered in the redetermination in a modification action; prohibiting an alimony award from being modified providing that if the court orders alimony concurrent with a child support order, the alimony award may not be modified because of the later modification or termination of child support payments; providing that the attaining of retirement age is a substantial change in circumstances; requiring the court to consider certain factors in determining whether the obligor's retirement is reasonable; requiring a court to terminate or reduce an alimony award based on certain factors; amending s. 61.19, F.S.; authorizing separate adjudication of issues in a dissolution of marriage case in certain circumstances; providing for retroactive application of the act to alimony awards entered before July 1, 2013; providing allowable dates for the modification of such awards; providing an effective date.

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS

BILL #:

HB 267

Real Property Liens and Conveyances

SPONSOR(S): Wood

TIED BILLS: None IDEN./SIM. BILLS: SB 404

REFERENCE	ACTION	ANALYST	STAFF DIRECTOR or BUDGET/POLICY CHIEF
1) Civil Justice Subcommittee		Keegan	Bond (HS
2) Local & Federal Affairs Committee			
3) Judiciary Committee			

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

Current law requires that the form of a warranty deed conveying real property must include a blank space for the grantee's social security number. Writing the grantee's social security number on a warranty deed is not mandatory, and failure to do so will not affect the validity of the deed. This bill removes the requirement to include the space for a social security number on a warranty deed.

The term "lien" refers to the legal right to foreclose against property if the underlying debt is unpaid. In general, a lienholder's priority as against other lienholders is determined by the date when the lienholder recorded the lien in the Official Records of the county. However, some liens may affect the title to real property even though unrecorded, which becomes problematic when such lien is not easily discoverable like those in the Official Records. This bill requires that a lien against real property must be recorded in the Official Records in order to be valid. This bill only applies to liens entered by a governmental or quasi-governmental entity for services. fines or penalties. However, a lien for taxes, non-ad valorem or special assessments, or utilities is not affected by this bill.

This bill does not appear to have a fiscal impact on state government. This bill may have a minimal negative fiscal impact on a local government that elects to pay the cost of recording previously unrecorded liens.

This bill has an effective date of October 1, 2013.

DATE: 2/11/2013

FULL ANALYSIS

I. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

A. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

The Statutory Warranty Deed Form

A warranty deed memorializes the transfer of real property. Common law provides that a warranty deed must include several promises that are considered binding on the parties, regardless of whether the promises are expressly listed in the deed.² Current law provides a statutory form of a warranty deed, however, the statutory form is not required for the deed to be valid.3 If the form of a warrantv deed substantially conforms to the statutory form, the deed will convey real property along with all of the common law promises.4

The statutory warranty deed form includes a blank space for the social security number of the individual or individuals acquiring the real property (known as a "grantee").5 This requirement was originally added to the warranty deed form in 1988.6 There is no penalty for failing to include a grantee's social security number on a warranty deed.⁷ and it is commonly omitted.

The blank space requirement was created as part of an act for alimony and child support reform.8 The apparent purpose of this blank space was to allow more effective recordkeeping of real property for the purpose of collecting overdue child support. However, because there is no indexing system utilizing the social security number, the requirement does not serve this purpose. There is no other apparent use for the social security number on a deed.

This bill removes the requirement from the statutory warranty deed to include a blank space for the grantee's social security number.

Lien Recording Requirements

A lien is a form of security interest to ensure payment of a debt or other obligation. ¹⁰ In general, a lien or other encumbrance against real property is legally binding against the owner of the real property from the time the lien is created. 11 However, a lien is generally not effective against the rights of another lienholder unless that lienholder has notice of the lien. 12 A lienholder may comply with the notice requirement by recording the lien in the Official Records, which are retained by the clerk of court in the county where the property is located. 13 The law recognizes the date a lien is recorded in the Official Records as the presumptive date the lien becomes effective against other parties.¹⁴

Section 689.03, F.S.

² 19 FLA. PRAC. SERIES, §3:8 (2012-2013 ed.).

³ Section 689.03, F.S.; 19 FLA. PRAC. SERIES, §3:8 (2012-2013 ed.).

⁴ Id.

⁵ Section 689.02(2), F.S.

⁶ S.B. 487, 1987-1988 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1988).

Section 689.02(2), F.S.

⁸ Chapter 88-175, 1988 L. O. F.

⁹ Fla. Dept. of Revenue, Office of Child Support Enforcement, 1988 HRS Legislative Proposal (1988) (on file with the State Archives of Florida.) ¹⁰ 19 FLA. PRAC. SERIES, *Florida Real Estate* § 37:1 (2012-2013 ed.)

¹² Argent Mortg. Co., LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52. So.3d 796, 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)

¹³ City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, 57 So.3d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Argent Mortg. Co., LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52. So.3d 796, 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); s. 695.11, F.S.; s. 28.222, F.S.

¹⁴ City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, 57 So.3d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Argent Mortg. Co., LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52. So.3d 796, 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); s. 695.11, F.S.; s. 28.222, F.S.

There is a class of liens commonly referred to as "hidden liens," which are not recorded in the Official Records. ¹⁵ A lienholder of a hidden lien may create the lien without recording such lien in the Official Records. Courts have upheld hidden liens in various circumstances. ¹⁶ When such a lien is not recorded in the Official Records, a general title search or a public records search will not reveal that the lien is attached to the title of the property.

This bill requires governmental and quasi-governmental entities to record a lien in the Official Records in order for the lien to be effective, thereby limiting those entities from utilizing hidden liens. This bill only applies to governmental or quasi-governmental liens for services, fines, or penalties, and does not apply to liens for taxes, non-ad valorem or special assessments, or utilities. A properly recorded lien must include the property owner's name, a property description or address, and the tax or parcel identification number.

Note that removal of lien rights does not affect liability for the underlying debt. That is, where a hidden lien is prohibited and the entity elects not to record a lien, the underlying debt is still owed and remains collectible. In practice, however, a debt without a lien is considered harder to collect.

B. SECTION DIRECTORY:

Section 1 amends s. 689.02(2), F.S., regarding the statutory warranty deed form.

Section 2 amends s. 695.01, F.S., regarding lien recording.

Section 3 provides an effective date of October 1, 2013.

II. FISCAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT

A. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENT:

1. Revenues:

This bill does not appear to have any impact on state revenues.

2. Expenditures:

This bill does not appear to have any impact on state expenditures.

B. FISCAL IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

1. Revenues:

This bill does not appear to have any fiscal impact on local government revenues.

2. Expenditures:

This bill may have an unknown impact on local government revenues. See fiscal comments.

C. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR:

This bill does not appear to have any direct economic impact on the private sector.

¹⁶ Dade County v. Certain Lands, 247 So.2d 787, 789 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1971).

STORAGE NAME: h0267.CJS.DOCX

DATE: 2/11/2013

¹⁵ Wanda Borges, *Hidden Liens: Who is Entitled to What?*, 103 Com. L.J. 284, 285 (1998).

D. FISCAL COMMENTS:

This bill is likely to have a positive but unknown fiscal impact on the private sector. It appears that this bill will lower transaction costs and limit unknown liabilities of transfer agents and purchasers of real property.

It is unknown how many local governments have created ordinances creating a hidden lien. Local governments will be able to elect one of three apparent means by which to respond to this bill, with the following fiscal impacts:

- A local government may elect to record previously unrecorded liens. Most liens only require a single page, which has a recording cost payable to the clerk of court or county recorder of \$10.00.¹⁷ The cost to such a local government would be these recording costs.
- A local government may elect to record previously unrecorded liens after amending the relevant ordinance to add the recording cost to the amount of the outstanding lien. In such case, this bill would have little to no fiscal impact on that local government.
- A local government may elect to forgo recording of liens and attempt to collect such monies without utilizing liens. In such case, the local government would save on recording costs but may see a decline in the collections rate.

III. COMMENTS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

1. Applicability of Municipality/County Mandates Provision:

Not applicable. This bill does not appear to require municipalities or counties to expend funds, reduce their authority over raising revenues in the aggregate, or reduce the percentage of a shared state tax.

2. Other:

None.

B. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY:

This bill does not appear to create a need for rulemaking or rulemaking authority.

C. DRAFTING ISSUES OR OTHER COMMENTS:

In 2002, the Office of Statewide Prosecution issued an interim report from the Sixteenth Statewide Grand Jury on identity theft in Florida. The report implies that social security number requirements facilitate identity theft. Reforms were passed in 2002 in reaction to this report, including an amendment to s. 119.0714, F.S., to prohibit including social security numbers on official records unless expressly required by law.

The Florida Department of Revenue (DOR) neither receives nor uses the social security numbers on deeds for the purpose of collecting child support or alimony. DOR has indicated that it does not foresee any problem with eliminating a blank space for a social security number on warranty deeds.¹⁸

STORAGE NAME: h0267.CJS.DOCX

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¹⁷ FLORIDA COURT CLERKS & COMPTROLLERS, DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE 73 (2012), available at http://www.flclerks.com/public_info.html (last viewed Feb. 11, 2013).

IV. AMENDMENTS/ COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE CHANGES

n/a

¹⁸ Legislative and Cabinet Services, Florida Department of Revenue, *Written Communication* (2012) (on file with the Civil Justice Subcommittee, Florida House of Representatives). STORAGE NAME: h0267.CJS.DOCX DATE: 2/11/2013

HB 267 2013

A bill to be entitled

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An act relating to real property liens and conveyances; amending s. 689.02, F.S.; deleting a requirement that blank spaces be included on a warranty deed to allow for entry of social security numbers of grantees on the deed; conforming provisions; amending s. 695.01, F.S.; providing that certain types of governmental or quasi-governmental liens on real property are valid and effectual against certain creditors and purchasers only if recorded in a specified manner; providing an effective date.

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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

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Section 1. Subsection (2) of section 689.02, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

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689.02 Form of warranty deed prescribed.-

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shall include a blank space for the property appraiser's parcel identification number describing the property conveyed, which number, if available, shall be entered on the deed before it is presented for recording, and blank spaces for the social security numbers of the grantees named in the deed, if available, which numbers may be entered on the deed before it is

The form for warranty deeds of conveyance to land

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presented for recording. The failure to include such blank space spaces, or the parcel identification number, or any social

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security number, or the inclusion of an incorrect parcel

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identification number or social security number, does shall not

Page 1 of 2

HB 267 2013

affect the validity of the conveyance or the recordability of the deed. Such parcel identification number <u>is shall</u> not constitute a part of the legal description of the property otherwise set forth in the deed and <u>may shall</u> not be used as a substitute for the legal description of the property being conveyed, nor shall a social security number serve as a designation of the grantee named in the deed.

Section 2. Subsection (3) is added to section 695.01, Florida Statutes, to read:

695.01 Conveyances and liens to be recorded.-

entity that attaches to real property for an improvement, service, fine, or penalty, other than a lien for taxes, non-ad valorem or special assessments, or utilities, is valid and effectual against creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration only if the lien is recorded in the official records of the county in which the property is located. The recorded notice of lien must contain the name of the owner of record, a description or address of the property, and the tax or parcel identification number applicable to the property as of the date of recording.

Section 3. This act shall take effect October 1, 2013.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS

BILL #:

HB 457

Worthless Checks, Drafts, or Orders of Payment

SPONSOR(S): Magar

TIED BILLS: None IDEN./SIM. BILLS:

SB 550

REFERENCE	ACTION	ANALYST	STAFF DIRECTOR or BUDGET/POLICY CHIEF
1) Civil Justice Subcommittee		Cary MC	Bond Ni
Business & Professional Regulation Subcommittee			
3) Judiciary Committee			

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

Before the recipient of a worthless check, draft or order of payment (hereinafter, "bad check") may sue the maker, the recipient must send a letter giving the maker 30 days to pay the check plus the statutory fee. If unpaid after 30 days, the recipient may sue for 3 times the amount of the check plus fees, costs and attorney fees.

This bill provides to a payee an alternative notice method that would allow the recipient of the bad check to proceed with a suit without providing the demand letter.

This bill does not appear to have a fiscal impact on state or local governments.

This bill provides an effective date of July 1, 2013.

DATE: 2/11/2013

FULL ANALYSIS

I. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

A. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

Background

While the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court, generally dictate the steps that litigants must follow in civil and criminal actions, the Legislature may pass substantive laws that a litigant must follow before getting into court. One such law requires a recipient (payee) of a check, draft, or order to send a demand letter and wait 30 days before filing suit against the maker of an instrument that is either refused by the drawee for lack of funds, credit or account, or which was made with the intent to defraud (hereinafter "bad check"). The state attorney may also prosecute under s. 832.07, F.S. ¹

The payee may also assess a service charge to the maker or drawer of the bad check.² The service charge is the greater of 5% of the face value of the bad check or \$25 for a bad check with a face value of \$50 or less, \$30 for a bad check with a face value greater than \$50 but not exceeding \$300, or \$40 for a bad check with a face value exceeding \$300.³ The maker or drawer is also liable for interest and bank fees.⁴

Prior to filing a lawsuit, current law requires the payee to provide the maker or drawer an opportunity to cure. The payee must send the maker or drawer a demand of payment by certified or registered mail or by first-class mail if the payee provides an affidavit of service. In order to avoid the suit, upon receipt of the demand letter the maker or drawer must, within 30 days, pay to the payee the full amount of the bad check and the service charge described above.⁵

If the maker or drawer does not tender the face value of the bad check plus the service charge to the payee within 30 days, the payee may file suit. The maker or drawer has another opportunity to avoid a judgment by tendering payment to the payee prior to the hearing equal to the sum of the face value of the bad check plus the service charge described above, court costs, incurred bank fees, attorney fees and collection costs. If the suit goes to judgment, the court may award that sum plus three-times the face value of the bad check.

Effect of the Bill

The bill provides an alternative to the payee to allow recovery without sending a demand letter by posting notice at the point of sale or printing notice on an invoice sent before payment that warns the maker or drafter that if the check or debit card transaction is returned by the bank for insufficient funds, the payee may collect the amount of the bad check plus the service charge. The notice reads:

If your check or debit card transaction is returned by your bank for insufficient funds, you authorize the collection of the amount of the check, as well as a return fee as provided in section 832.08(5), Florida Statutes.

There are drafting issues in this bill that may affect the apparent intent of this bill. See the Drafting Issues section below.

Section 68.065(1), F.S.

Section 68.065(2), F.S.

³ Section 832.08(5), F.S.

⁴ Section 68.065(2), F.S.

⁵ Section 68.065(3), F.S.

⁶ Section 68.065(5), F.S.

⁷ Section 68.065(1), F.S.

STORAGE NAME: h0457.CJS.DOCX

B. SECTION DIRECTORY:

Section 1 amends s. 68.065, F.S., relating to actions to collect worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment.

Section 2 provides an effective date of July 1, 2013.

II. FISCAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT

A. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENT:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state expenditures.

B. FISCAL IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government expenditures.

C. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR:

The bill does not appear to have any direct economic impact on the private sector

D. FISCAL COMMENTS:

None.

III. COMMENTS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

1. Applicability of Municipality/County Mandates Provision:

The bill does not appear to require counties or municipalities to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds, reduce the authority that counties or municipalities have to raise revenue in the aggregate, nor reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties or municipalities.

2. Other:

None.

B. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY:

The bill does not appear to create a need for rulemaking or rulemaking authority.

STORAGE NAME: h0457.CJS.DOCX

DATE: 2/11/2013

C. DRAFTING ISSUES OR OTHER COMMENTS:

The bill creates an alternative notice to the demand letter, but does not eliminate the requirement for the demand letter in subsection (1) of s. 68.065, F.S. The bill also retains current language that could limit recovery under the alternative notice method. There is a risk to payees that may choose to utilize the alternative notice method that a court may reject any filing that does not include either a return receipt or an affidavit that shows evidence that a demand letter was sent to the maker or drawer.

IV. AMENDMENTS/ COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE CHANGES

n/a

STORAGE NAME: h0457.CJS.DOCX

DATE: 2/11/2013

A bill to be entitled

An act relating to worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment; amending s. 68.065, F.S.; permitting recovery of worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment without the sending of a specified written demand if the payee has a specified notice posted at the point of sale or on an invoice; providing an effective date.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1. Section 68.065, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

68.065 Actions to collect worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment; attorney attorney's fees and collection costs.—

(1) In any civil action brought for the purpose of collecting a check, draft, or order of payment, the payment of which was refused by the drawee because of the lack of funds, credit, or an account, or where the maker or drawer stops payment on the check, draft, or order of payment with intent to defraud, and where the maker or drawer fails to pay the amount owing, in cash, to the payee within 30 days following a written demand therefor, as provided in subsection (3), the maker or drawer shall be liable to the payee, in addition to the amount owing upon such check, draft, or order, for damages of triple the amount so owing. However, in no case shall the liability for damages be less than \$50. The maker or drawer shall also be

Page 1 of 4

liable for any court costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the payee in taking the action. Criminal sanctions, as provided in s. 832.07, may be applicable.

- (2) The payee may also charge the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment a service charge not to exceed the service fees authorized under s. 832.08(5) or 5 percent of the face amount of the instrument, whichever is greater, when making written demand for payment. In the event that a judgment or decree is rendered, interest at the rate and in the manner described in s. 55.03 may be added toward the total amount due. Any bank fees incurred by the payee may be charged to the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment.
- (3) Before recovery under this section may be claimed, either:
- (a) A written demand must be delivered by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, or by first-class mail, evidenced by an affidavit of service of mail, to the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment to the address on the check or other instrument, to the address given by the drawer at the time the instrument was issued, or to the drawer's last known address. The form of such notice shall be substantially as follows:

"You are hereby notified that a check numbered in the face amount of \$.... issued by you on ...(date)..., drawn upon ...(name of bank)..., and payable to, has been dishonored. Pursuant to Florida law, you have 30 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment in cash of the full amount of the check, plus a service charge of \$25, if the face value does not

exceed \$50, \$30, \$40, if the face value exceeds \$50 but does not exceed \$300, \$40, if the face value exceeds \$300, or 5 percent of the face amount of the check, whichever is greater, the total amount due being \$... and ... cents. Unless this amount is paid in full within the 30-day period, the holder of the check or instrument may file a civil action against you for three times the amount of the check, but in no case less than \$50, in addition to the payment of the check plus any court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and any bank fees incurred by the payee in taking the action-"; or

(b) The payee must have posted at the point of sale or have printed on an invoice sent before payment for goods or services a notice in substantially the following form:

"If your check or debit card transaction is returned by your bank for insufficient funds, you authorize the collection of the amount of the check, as well as a return fee as provided in section 832.08(5), Florida Statutes."

(4) A subsequent person receiving a check, draft, or order, from the original payee or a successor endorsee has the same rights that the original payee has against the maker of the instrument, provided such subsequent person gives notice in a substantially similar form to that provided in subsection (3) above. A subsequent person providing such notice shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice, so long as the maker of the instrument has the same defenses against the subsequent

Page 3 of 4

person as against the original payee. However, the remedies available under this section may be exercised only by one party in interest.

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- (5) After Subsequent to the commencement of the action but before prior to the hearing, the maker or drawer may tender to the payee, as satisfaction of the claim, an amount of money equal to the sum of the check, the service charge, court costs, and incurred bank fees. Other provisions notwithstanding, the maker or drawer is liable to the payee for all attorney fees and collection costs incurred by payee as a result of the payee's claim.
- (6) If the court or jury determines that the failure of the maker or drawer to satisfy the dishonored check was due to economic hardship, the court or jury has the discretion to waive all or part of the statutory damages.
 - Section 2. This act shall take effect July 1, 2013.

Page 4 of 4



Bill No. HB 457 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITT	ree ACTION
ADOPTED	(Y/N)
ADOPTED AS AMENDED	(Y/N)
ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION	(Y/N)
FAILED TO ADOPT	(Y/N)
WITHDRAWN	(Y/N)
OTHER	
	Day yang talang panamanan kan sa wasan kalan na atau ka 100 km minin kalang yang kacamanan ka

Committee/Subcommittee hearing bill: Civil Justice Subcommittee Representative Magar offered the following:

Amendment (with title amendment)

Remove everything after the enacting clause and insert: Section 1. Section 68.065, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:


68.065 Actions to collect worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment, debit card orders, or electronic funds transfers; attorney attorney's fees and collection costs.—

(1) The payee of any check, draft, order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer of which was refused by the drawee because of the lack of funds, credit, or an account, or where the maker or drawer stops payment on the check, draft, order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer with intent to defraud, may lawfully collect bank fees actually incurred by the payee in the course of tendering the payment, plus a service charge of \$25, if the face value does not exceed \$50, \$30, if the face value exceeds \$50 but does not exceed \$300, \$40, if the face value exceeds \$300, or 5 percent of the

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Amendment No. 1
face amount of the check, draft, order of payment, debit card
order, or electronic funds transfer, whichever is greater. The
right to damages under this subsection may be claimed without
the filing of a civil action. This service charge is not in
addition to any right to a service charge pursuant to subsection
(2), s. 832.062(4)(a), or s. 832.07.

(2) (1) In any civil action brought for the purpose of collecting a check, draft, or order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer, the payment of which was refused by the drawee because of the lack of funds, credit, or an account, or where the maker or drawer stops payment on the check, draft, or order of payment with intent to defraud, and where the maker or drawer fails to pay the amount owing, in cash, to the payee within 30 days following a written demand therefor, if required by as provided in subsection (4) (3), the maker or drawer shall be liable to the payee, in addition to the amount owing upon such check, draft, or order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer, for damages of triple the amount so owing. However, in no case shall the liability for damages be less than \$50. The maker or drawer shall also be liable for any court costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the payee in taking the action. Criminal sanctions, as provided in s. 832.07, may be applicable.

(3)(2) The payee may also charge the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment a service charge not to exceed the service fees authorized under s. 832.08(5) or 5 percent of the face amount of the instrument, whichever is greater, when making written demand for payment. In the event



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 457 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 that a judgment or decree is rendered, interest at the rate and in the manner described in s. 55.03 may be added toward the total amount due. Any bank fees incurred by the payee may be charged to the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer.

(4)(3) Before recovery under this section may be claimed, a written demand must be delivered by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, or by first-class mail, evidenced by an affidavit of service of mail, to the maker or drawer of the check, draft, or order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer to the address on the check or other instrument, to the address given by the drawer at the time the instrument was issued, or to the drawer's last known address. The form of such notice shall be substantially as follows:

"You are hereby notified that a check numbered in the face amount of \$.... issued by you on ...(date)..., drawn upon ...(name of bank)..., and payable to, has been dishonored. Pursuant to Florida law, you have 30 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment in cash of the full amount of the check plus a service charge of \$25, if the face value does not exceed \$50, \$30, if the face value exceeds \$50 but does not exceed \$300, \$40, if the face value exceeds \$300, or 5 percent of the face amount of the check, whichever is greater, the total amount due being \$.... and cents. Unless this amount is paid in full within the 30-day period, the holder of the check or instrument may file a civil action against you for three times the amount of the check, but in no case less than \$50, in



COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT

Bill No. HB 457 (2013)

Amendment No. 1 addition to the payment of the check plus any court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and any bank fees incurred by the payee in taking the action."

(5)(4) A subsequent person receiving a check, draft, er order of payment, debit card order, or electronic funds transfer, from the original payee or a successor endorsee has the same rights that the original payee has against the maker of the instrument, provided such subsequent person gives notice in a substantially similar form to that provided above. A subsequent person providing such notice shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice, so long as the maker of the instrument has the same defenses against the subsequent person as against the original payee. However, the remedies available under this section may be exercised only by one party in interest.

(6)(5) Subsequent to the commencement of the action but prior to the hearing, the maker or drawer may tender to the payee, as satisfaction of the claim, an amount of money equal to the sum of the check or other instrument, the service charge, court costs, and incurred bank fees. Other provisions notwithstanding, the maker or drawer is liable to the payee for all attorney fees and collection costs incurred by payee as a result of the payee's claim.

(7)(6) If the court or jury determines that the failure of the maker or drawer to satisfy the dishonored check or other instrument was due to economic hardship, the court or jury has the discretion to waive all or part of the statutory damages.



Bill No. HB 457 (2013)

Amendment No. 1

Section 2. This act shall take effect July 1, 2013.

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TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove everything before the enacting clause and insert: An act relating to worthless checks, drafts, orders of payment, debit card orders, or electronic funds tranfers; amending s. 68.065, F.S.; permitting recovery of bank fees and a service charge related to worthless checks, drafts, or orders of payment without the sending of a specified written demand or the filing of a civil action; providing an effective date.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS

BILL #:

PCB CJS 13-02

Expert Testimony

REFERENCE

SPONSOR(S): Civil Justice Subcommittee

TIED BILLS: None IDEN./SIM. BILLS:

None

STAFF DIRECTOR or

BUDGET/POLICY CHIEF

Orig. Comm.: Civil Justice Subcommittee

Cary Bond

ANALYST

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

ACTION

An expert witness is a person who has developed skill or knowledge in a particular subject, so that he or she may form an opinion that will assist the fact-finder during a hearing or trial. In evaluating whether testimony of a particular expert witness will be admitted in a Florida court, the court looks at whether or not the underlying basic principles of evidence are generally accepted within the scientific community. The standard is known as the Frve standard.

This bill rejects the Frye standard and provides a three-part test to determine whether or not expert testimony will be admitted in a particular case. This bill adopts a standard commonly referred to as the Daubert standard. which requires the court to determine if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

This bill does not appear to have a fiscal impact on state or local government.

This bill contains an effective date of July 1, 2013.

This document does not reflect the intent or official position of the bill sponsor or House of Representatives. STORAGE NAME: pcb02a.CJS.DOCX

DATE: 2/8/2013

FULL ANALYSIS

I. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS

A. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

Expert Witness

An expert witness is a person, who, through education or experience, has developed skill or knowledge in a particular subject, so that he or she may form an opinion that will assist the fact-finder. Previously, both Federal and Florida courts used the standard established in *Frye v. United States*² to determine whether scientific and expert testimony could be admitted into evidence. In *Frye*, the court established a test regarding the admission of expert testimony about new or novel theories. The court held that in order to introduce expert testimony deduced from a scientific principle or discovery, the principle or discovery "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Under the *Frye* standard, a judge must determine that the basic underlying principles of scientific evidence have been tested and accepted by the scientific community.

The Federal Rules of Evidence were formally promulgated in 1975. Federal courts still continued to use the *Frye* standard until 1993, though, when the United States Supreme Court held in *Daubert*⁴ that the *Frye* standard had been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence which provides in relevant part that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.⁵

The Florida Evidence Code was established in 1979 and was patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. Section 90.102, F.S., provides that the Florida Evidence Code replaces and supersedes existing statutory or common law in conflict with its provisions. Section 90.702, F.S., relates to the admissibility of expert witness testimony and provides that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.⁶

Florida courts still use the Frye standard, however, for expert testimony. The Florida Supreme Court held in $Brim\ v.$ State that "despite the federal adoption of a more lenient standard in Daubert... we have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by Frye."

¹ Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (West Publishing Co. 2009), "expert."

² Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

*³ Id.*at 1013.

⁴ Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US. 579 (1993).

⁵ Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence.

⁶ Section 90.702, F.S.

⁷ Flanagan v. State, 625 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1993); Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1997).

³ *Brim v. State*, 695 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997).

In November 2007, the Florida Supreme Court decided *Marsh v. Valyou*. In the case, the court addressed a conflict between the 1st and the 5th Florida District Courts of Appeal regarding expert testimony on fibromyalgia. The court held that the testimony should have come in under pure opinion testimony and in the alternative should have also come in under *Frye*. In the concurring opinion, Justice Anstead questioned why Florida still uses the *Frye* standard, stating that "we have never explained how *Frye* has survived the adoption of the rules of evidence." Both the concurring and dissenting opinions concluded that *Frye* was superseded by the adoption of Florida's Evidence Code.

Effect of the Bill

This bill amends s. 90.702, F.S., to provide a standard regarding witness testimony that is more closely related to *Daubert* and the Federal Code of Evidence than *Frye*. This bill provides a three-part test to be used in determining whether an expert may testify. The test provides that an expert may testify in the particular field in which he or she is qualified in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

- The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,
- The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
- The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts.

The bill requires the courts of this state to interpret and apply the above requirements and s. 90.704, F.S., in accordance with *Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases that reaffirm expert witness testimony under the *Daubert* standard. The *Daubert* standard laid out in the bill will also apply to all proposed expert testimony, including pure opinion testimony as discussed in *Marsh v. Valyou*. The bill also provides that *Frye v. United States* and subsequent Florida decisions applying and implementing *Frye* no longer apply to s. 90.702, F.S., or s. 90.704, F.S.

B. SECTION DIRECTORY:

Section 1 amends s. 90.702, F.S., regarding testimony by experts.

Section 2 amends s. 90.704, F.S., regarding the basis of opinion testimony by experts.

Section 3 provides an effective date of July 1, 2013.

II. FISCAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT

A. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE GOVERNMENT:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on state revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The change in standard to admit expert opinions in Florida courts may have an impact on the number of pre-trial hearings needed, but it is difficult to estimate due to the unavailability of data needed to quantify any increase or decrease in judicial workload.

² *Marsh* at 551.

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⁹ Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2007).

¹⁰ Fibromyalgia is a chronic condition characterized by widespread pain in the muscles, ligaments and tendons, as well as fatigue and multiple tender points. See http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/fibromyalgia/DS00079 (last visited February 7, 2013).

Pure opinion testimony is based on the expert's personal experience and training and does not have to meet the *Frye* standard. *See Flanagan*, 625 So. 2d at 828.

In criminal proceedings, the state may incur costs, and it is difficult to affirmatively quantify, in that well-established evidentiary standards in areas involving mental health, substance abuse, cognitive dysfunction, dual diagnosis, psychosis, and other areas litigated in some criminal cases may be expanded beyond the already extensive body of testimony and evidence currently litigated.

B. FISCAL IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

1. Revenues:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government revenues.

2. Expenditures:

The bill does not appear to have any impact on local government expenditures.

C. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR:

The bill does not appear to have any direct economic impact on the private sector.

D. FISCAL COMMENTS:

None.

III. COMMENTS

A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:

1. Applicability of Municipality/County Mandates Provision:

The bill does not appear to require counties or municipalities to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds, reduce the authority that counties or municipalities have to raise revenue in the aggregate, nor reduce the percentage of state tax shared with counties or municipalities.

2. Other:

There is a balance between enactments of the Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court on matters relating to evidence. The Legislature has enacted and continues to revise ch. 90, F.S. (the Evidence Code), and the Florida Supreme Court tends to adopt these changes as rules. The Florida Supreme Court regularly adopts amendments to the Evidence Code as rules of court when it is determined that the matter is procedural rather than substantive. If the Florida Supreme Court views the changes in this bill as an infringement upon the Court's authority over practice and procedure, it may refuse to adopt the changes in the bill as a rule. 13

B. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY:

The bill does not appear to create a need for rulemaking or rulemaking authority.

C. DRAFTING ISSUES OR OTHER COMMENTS:

None.

DATE: 2/8/2013

¹³ See, e.g., In re Florida Evidence Code, 782 So.2d 339 (Fla. 2000) (Florida Supreme Court adopting Evidence Code to the extent it is procedural and rejecting hearsay exception as a rule of court); compare In re Florida Evidence Code. 372 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1979) (Florida Supreme Court adopting Florida Evidence Code to the extent it is procedural). clarified. In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1979). STORAGE NAME: pcb02a.CJS.DOCX

IV. AMENDMENTS/ COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE CHANGES

n/a

STORAGE NAME: pcb02a.CJS.DOCX DATE: 2/8/2013

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A bill to be entitled

An act relating to expert testimony; amending s. 90.702, F.S.; providing that a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion as to the facts at issue in a case under certain circumstances; requiring the courts of this state to interpret and apply the principles of expert testimony in conformity with specified United States Supreme Court decisions; subjecting pure opinion testimony to such requirements; amending s. 90.704, F.S.; providing that facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible in evidence may not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that the probative value of the facts or data in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect of the facts or data; providing an effective date.

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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

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Section 1. Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

90.702 Testimony by experts.-

(1) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

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education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

- (a) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
- (b) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
- (c) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
- (2) The courts of this state shall interpret and apply the requirements of subsection (1) and s. 90.704 in accordance with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and subsequent Florida decisions applying or implementing Frye no longer apply to subsection (1) or s. 90.704. All proposed expert testimony, including pure opinion testimony as discussed in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007), is subject to subsection (1) and s. 90.704.

Section 2. Section 90.704, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

90.704 Basis of opinion testimony by experts.—The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial. If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to

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the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

Section 3. This act shall take effect July 1, 2013.

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